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MARITIME LIEN PRIORITIES: CROSS-CURRENTS 
OF THEORY 
Roger G. Connor* 
THE subject of maritime lien priorities is often said to be permeated with confusion.1 The responsibility for the con-
fusion lies partly in the variety of fact situations which are pre-
sented for decision as well as in the competing policies and atti-
tudes in this field. Another condition to be reckoned with is that 
the great bulk of admiralty law is molded by the federal district 
and circuit courts, operating independently of each other for the 
most part, with only an occasional ruling by the Supreme Court. 
The observer is somewhat in the position of one trying to learn 
what rules of the common law are uniform throughout the United 
States. PredictabiliW is at a low level. Nonetheless, the existing 
rules and policies can be pinpointed, and when this is done some 
of the alleged uncertainty disappears, at least in the more typical 
cases. The purpose of this article is not to develop a synthesis, for 
no synthesis is possible, but to give an account of the general 
theories governing maritime lien priorities, together with a dis-
cussion of the concrete issues which arise in their application. 
An obvious fact should be stated at the outset. The problem 
of priorities arises only when the fund produced by sale of the 
vessel is insufficient to satisfy all claimants. It is essentially a prob-
lem in distribution. The other basic fact is that the determination 
of priority is separate from the question of the existence of the 
lien. The validity of the lien is first determined, then its priority. 
In many cases the two questions are discussed together, leading to 
a confusion of thought if one is not on guard. But the distinction 
is basic and clearly recognized. The original classification of a 
claim against a vessel and the determination of its validity are, 
from a realistic standpoint, crucial to the priority which it will 
receive. To a certain extent the two problems are interacting. 
As Justice Curtis said, " . . . incumbrances created by maritime 
liens are marshalled according to the causes from which such liens 
spring."2 It does not follow, however, that because a lien is 
• B.A. 1951, University of Washington; LL.B. 1954, University of Michigan; member, 
Alaska bar; United States Attomey,·First Judicial Division of Alaska, at Juneau.-Ed. 
1 The City of Tawas, (D.C. Mich. 1880) 3 F. 170 at 172, and ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §61 
(1939). . 
2The Young Mechanic, (C.C. Me. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 18,180, at 876. 
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granted as "seamen's wages" it will always be deemed to have the 
priority over other liens which is commonly accorded to the wage 
claims of seamen. Validity and priority are for the most part 
separate hurdles in the path of the claimant. 
It is generally agreed that the priority of maritime liens is de-
termined by the character of the lien itself and by the time at 
which the lien accrues. The method of classifying the liens, plac-
ing the classes into ranks, and selecting the applicable time prior-
ity, make up the subject matter of this article. The scheme of ex-
position adopted here is to state what appear to be the general 
doctrines of time and class priorities, followed by a development 
of the leading issues to be encountered in the application of those 
doctrines. By first laying down a set of constructs from which to 
operate it becomes much easier to embark upon a more detailed 
analysis of the issues and their resolution. 
It is common to explain the adjustment of maritime liens as a 
situation calling for the application of equitable principles. Much 
reliance is placed upon the language of Justice Brown: 
"Although courts of admiralty have no general equity ju-
risdiction and cannot afford equitable relief in a direct pro-
ceeding for that purpose, they may apply equitable principles 
to subjects within their jurisdiction, and in the distribution 
of proceeds in their possession or under their control may 
give effect to equitable claims."3 
To many this denotes the equitable principles of a Lord Eldon: 
a developed, ascertained body of rules. It is a judicial declaration 
that admiralty courts will recognize equitable doctrines and de-
fenses pertaining to ownership, !aches, subrogation, and marshall-
ing of assets just as the state courts do under the procedural codes. 
Some courts, on the other hand, have taken this language as a 
license to exercise a broad discretion more reminiscent of the ec-
clesiastical chancellors. It is used as a justification for determining 
lien priorities according to how the case strikes the conscience of 
the court, and as a denial of any fixity in the methods of distribu-
tion. This is sometimes referred to euphemistically as the use of 
a "wholesome equity."4 The important thing to understand is that 
the courts may have differing conceptions of what their true func-
tion is in these cases. 
3 United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 at 194, 26 S.Ct. 648 (1906). 
4 The Samuel Little, (2d Cir. 1915) 221 F. 308 at 317. 
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I. TIME AND I TS CRITERIA 
The basic datum of time priority is the day when a vessel is 
libelled in rem by any lienor. Others can file subsequently, but it 
is well settled that time is reckoned backward from the date of the 
first libel. It is a hallowed doctrine that priority is determined by 
the inverse order of the time of accrual of the liens, that is, the 
more recently created lien is superior to a lien created at an earlier 
time. This is contrary to the familiar common law rule of "first in 
time, first in right." 
The admiralty rule would be of easy application if it operated 
according to a conception of strict time. One would need only find 
the date of accrual of each lien, arrange the dates in consecutive 
order, and give preference to the more recent ones. Instead the 
modern practice is along different lines. A period of time is taken 
as the criterion. This period may be the voyage, the season, the 
calendar year, 40-days, 90-days, or, as some have urged, "a reason-
able period of credit." Whatever the period, it is reckoned back-
ward from the date of the libel. If it is the voyage, all liens arising 
on the most recent voyage are taken as if they had accrued at the 
same time, and they share pari passu in the proceeds of the vessel. 
If it is the calendar year, all liens arising in the calendar year in 
which the vessel is libelled are on an equal plane so far as time 
priority is concerned. The season period and the 40-day or 90-day 
periods, sometimes known as the "harbor rules," operate in a simi-
lar fashion. Once given a certain period as the basis of time pri-
ority, and given the fact that liens in the most recent period are of 
first priority together, the question remains concerning those liens 
which have arisen in an earlier period of time. Are they to be 
placed in a series of successive periods, each with seniority inversely 
over the others, or are they to be placed in a single group, all junior 
to the most recent period before the filing of the libel, but co-equal 
among themselves? It seems to depend upon which one of the 
periods is selected as the applicable one to the case at hand. These 
and like questions will be taken up below. 
A. Toward a New Theory of Time Priority. The orgins of 
time priority are said to rest upon at least two theories, each of 
which involves a deductive conclusion about the nature of mari-
time liens. Under the "property" theory each lienor not only ac-
quires a claim against the vessel at the time the lien attaches but 
becomes a part owner in the vessel as well. As an owner, he is sub-
jected to any later liens which may accrue. The later claimants 
should have priority over all who have an "ownership" in the ves-
780 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
sel, for it is axiomatic that maritime liens are superior to mere 
rights of ownership. That .in brief is the property theory. There 
would seem to be an essential gap in this process of reasoning, 
however. The earlier lienors are no more owners than the later 
ones. They all obtain a property interest on the creation of their 
respective liens, including the last one in point of time. It is not 
adequately explained how a lien, which is something more than 
a mere right of ownership, becomes less than a lien by the occur-
rence of another one later in time. This undeniable paradox has 
not troubled the courts to any noteworthy extent. Here, as in 
other areas of the law, a circularity of reasoning may produce de-
sirable results, though it may be logically unsound. At any rate 
the idea of a maritime lien as a property right is historically well-
based. In the nineteenth century the courts repeatedly observed 
that the liens were a jus in re and not a jus ad re.5 
"Indeed, if a maritime lien be merely a privilege to attach 
the vessel for a debt, which becomes an incumbrance only in 
virtue of an actual attachment, it is difficult to see, how it 
amounts to any special privilege in the New England states, 
where every creditor has the privilege of attaching all vessels 
for all debts, which become incumbrances by virtue of such 
attachments. Incumbrances created merely by attachments, 
must take rank, in the absence of positive provisions of law to 
the contrary, according to the dates of such attachments. But 
incumbrances created by maritime liens are marshalled ac-
cording to the causes from which such liens spring. That is, 
they subsist, and bind the property, not in virtue of the legal 
process used to enforce them, but by operation of the law 
which creates them and fixes them on the · property, at the 
moment when the debts are incurred."6 
That this basic concept has not changed appreciably in the 
course of a century can be seen by the statement of a present day 
·writer on admiralty: 
"In the United States admiralty practice, the maritime 
lien and the right in rem-jus in rem-are closely identified 
and exist together. The right in rem is only available to en-
force a maritime lien, and only against the identical ship, 
cargo or freight money concerned. The details of this prac-
tice are quite different from those now prevailing in England 
or in the British Commonwealths. In the United States, a 
right in rem may be asserted against a ship without regard for 
5 The Yankee Blade (Vandewater v. Mills), 19 How. (60 U.S.) 82 (1856). 
6 The Young Mechanic, (C.C. Me. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 18,180, at 876. 
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the presence or absence of the owner or agent; the ship will be 
arrested in rem by the Marshal of the federal court even if the 
shipowner is standing at the spot offering to give an appear-
ance in the law suit."7 
The contrast between admiralty and the common law approach 
is especially keen in the matter of enforcement of rights and duties. 
"In a general sense, the policy of the common law is to 
litigate the liability first, and afterwards assist the successful 
party to seek the means of payment. The thought is that the 
defendant and his property will remain in the jurisdiction 
during the litigation and will remain solvent. That of course 
is usually true when litigation concerns lands and houses and 
domestic property. It is less true when the law suit concerns 
money and credits. It is almost never true when litigation 
concerns ships in the sea trades. The admiralty court, with 
its process in rem and its attachment process as a first step in 
litigation, secures the means of payment of the decree at the 
very commencement of the lawsuit. This is well adapted to 
shipping cases when the ship, her owner and the witnesses may 
sail _away and never return."8 
The other traditional basis of time priority is known as the 
"benefit" theory. The reasoning is that the later lienor has con-
ferred a benefit upon the res and has helped to preserve it for all 
concerned, including lienors. It is as if each lienor were a contrib-
utor to the venture, and as if the successive lienors provided goods 
and services without which the vessel could not have gone on. As 
an explanation of why the law should impose an inverse time pri-
ority upon ship chandlers and repairmen it is largely based on 
truth. But applied to tort claims the theory contains obvious de-
fects. The offending vessel in a collision has incurred a detriment 
rather than a benefit. The property theory, on the other hand, 
encompasses liens of every sort. 
The effect of either of these theories, if rigidly applied, would 
be to encourage the utmost diligence in enforcement. Priority 
would be determined by strict time, and presumably an hour's 
difference would be enough to prefer one claim to another. At 
least a consistent application of the principle would require that 
result.9 It would not matter that the earlier lienors had no oppor-
7 Knauth, "Characteristics of United States Maritime Law," 13 Mn. L. REv. 1 at 11 
(1953). 
Sid. at Zl. 
9 The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore, P.C. 267 (1850-51), from which much of the "prop-
erty" thinking in the United States is derived, seems to take a strict time approach. 
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tunity to enforce their claims by reason of the vessel being out of 
reach. In fact a literal adherence to the principle would mean that 
all class rankings would have to give way. 
The· courts have modified the premium on diligence, however, 
by having time periods as the test of priority. By saying that all 
liens arising during a voyage or season will be considered as arising 
at the same time, the courts have given recognition to the need for 
an opportunity .to enforce the lien. One need be diligent only to 
the extent that a time period rule requires it. And the measure 
of diligence is the opportunity to enforce. A voyage rule means 
that those who have supplied the vessel at the start of the voyage 
will not lose their priority until the end of the voyage when they 
have an opportunity to find and arrest the vessel. A season rule 
means that those who acquire liens at the beginning of a season, 
or during it, can locate the vessel when it is tied up at the close of 
activity without being deferred to intervening liens. It is intimated 
in The]. W. Tucker10 that the voyage rule (by parity of reasoning 
the other period rules should be included) was erected for the pur-
pose of mitigating the harshness of strict time priority, which im-
pinged most severely upon those- furnishing supplies and repairs. 
At any rate the voyage concept is deeply ingrained in American 
admiralty.11 
From a realistic standpoint the introduction of period rules, as 
a qualification upon the property and benefit principles, works 
such a fundamental change in operation that the qualifications 
would seem to swallow the rule. If a theory of time priority is 
desired, it would be preferable to say that liens are adjusted by two 
main considerations: (1) reasonable diligence; (2) reasonable op-
portunity to enforce. As a.description of what the courts do, and 
as an expression of the policies at work, this is somewhat closer to 
reality than an abstraction such as "property" or "benefit."12 Fur-
thermore, it is a less cumbersome method of explaining time pri-
ority than to go through the mental gymnastics of strict time pri-
ority to arrive at a system in which strict time has little place. 
Occasionally it has been suggested that time priority ought to 
operate as at common law: "first in time, first in right." For a while 
10 (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. 
11 The Paragon, (D.C. Mass. 1836) Fed. Cas. No. 10,708, mentions a voyage rule of 
priority for supplymen. Though no citations are given, it still shows that a notion of 
voyage was familiar at an early date. 
12 That the "property" concept is susceptible to conflicting interpretations can be seen 
in such cases as The J. W. Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. 
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it was thought by some very competent admiralty jurists in the 
Second Circuit that inverse priority applied only in cases of liens 
which were beneficial in nature. It was believed that torts were 
outside the scope of the rule. Judge Blatchford declared that the 
property theory was without authority.13 Judge Addison Brown 
agreed with the result, but did so by means of the property 
theory.14 He reasoned that because a tort lien is a substantial right 
of property it should not be displaced by later incumbrances.15 
It can be said that these views did not make serious inroads upon 
traditional doctrine in other districts. This is due in large part to 
the subsequent reaffirmation of faith in the property theory by the 
Supreme Court in The ]ohn-G. Stevens.16 
B. The Voyage Rule. This venerable rule has been applied 
chiefly to ocean-going vessels which operated on fairly distinct and 
definite voyages.17 In the days of sail and before steamship sched-
ules existed it was the natural time period to select. With modem 
times conditions have changed appreciably, and the rationality of 
the rule has been criticized. Professor Robinson has argued for a 
"reasonable period of credit" as a substitute, pointing out that in 
the case of fast steamers the voyage may be shorter than the 40-days 
allowed for harbor vessels in New York.18 In the City of Athens,19 
with only ten percent of the fund left for supply claimants, counsel 
were astute to urge upon the court a "year rule" as a reasonable 
period of credit for the vessel involved, which was an ocean-going 
steamer. Judge Chesnut said: 
"On this point it has sometimes been said that the judicial 
decisions are in confusion; but an examination of very many 
cases leads to the conclusion that this statement is correct only 
insofar as it is applicable to other than ocean voyages of ships. 
18 The Frank G. Fowler, (C.C. N.Y. 1883) 17 F. 653, in which the court said that only 
the dictum of Judge Hall in The America, (D.C. N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288, could be 
mustered in support of an inverse order for non-beneficial liens. 
14 The J. W. Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. He recognized the compulsion of 
The Yankee Blade (Vandewater v. Mills), 19 How. (60 U.S.) 82 (1856), and The Young 
Mechanic, (C.C. Me. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 18,180, at 876. 
15 Other than The Frank G. Fowler, (C.C. N.Y. 1883) 17 F. 653, he relied upon The 
Jerusalem, (C.C. Mass. 1815) Fed. Cas. No. 7,294. But a careful reading of that case reveals 
that Justice Story did not say that non-beneficial liens go by a common law priority. He 
did not mention tort liens. Rather he noted (at 566) that the supplyman's lien is "not like 
a dry lien by way of mortgage or other collateral title." He was contrasting maritime liens 
in general with those at common law. 
16 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
17The Melita, (D.C. Md. 1880) Fed. Cas. No. 6,218; Porter v. The Sea Witch, (C.C. La. 
1877) Fed. Cas. No. 11,289. 
18 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 427-428 (1939). 
19 (D.C. Md. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 67, 1949 A.M.C. 572. 
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The rule originally developed in admiralty law and still the 
basic rule is that maritime liens of the same class are entitled 
to _priority of payment in the inverse order of the time of ac-
crual and that therefore liens arising in connection with the 
last voyage of the ship have priority of payment over liens ac-
cruing on a prior voyage."20 
In rejecting the reasonable period of credit the court stated 
that the case law is entirely in favor of a voyage rule for ocean-
going vessels, that the voyage is still a desirable time determinant 
because it encourages credit at ports of call more than would a set 
period like a year, and that the court did not have sufficient infor-
mation on shipping practices throughout the United States to lay 
down a reasonable period of credit. The court did note that a 
voyage rule presupposes an appreciable time lapse between trips. 
The implication would seem to be that a reasonable opportunity 
to enforce must be present. Presumably lienors would not be cut 
off ff the ship were in port only a few hours before it departed 
agam. 
It is clear that the voyage rule is one of successive periods, each 
voyage being senior in priority to the one before.21 To make the 
rule meaningful it wou~d be necessary to consider supplies fur-
nished in preparation for a voyage as furnished on that voyage.22 
A few courts have held that liens arising in ports of call are pre-
ferred to those obtained at the start of the voyage.23 This is a cross 
between a strict time approach (because the opportunity to enforce 
is not considered) and the voyage rule (because liens at any given 
port are taken as arising at substantially the same time instead of 
by precise date). These cases could best be described as embodying 
a "fractional voyage rule" which seems an anomaly. The better 
approach would be a continuing voyage rule whereby priority 
would be retained until the vessel touches the home port again.24 
20 83 F. Supp. at 79. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The J. W. Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129, and The Brimstone, (2d Cir. 1934) 
69 F. (2d) 106, 1934 .A.M.C. 283. 
23 The Fanny, (D.C. Mass. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 4,638, where the court says (at 994) 
time priority is granted" .•. when a voyage or part of a voyage has intervened .•. "; and 
The Omer, (D.C. Va. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 10,510, in which it was held that repairmen at 
an intermediate port cut off suppliers at the home port, upon the ground that the repair-
men contributed "most immediately" to the completion of the voyage. 
24 In The Nisseqogue, (D.C. N.C. 1922) 280 F. 174, Judge Connor held in the case of 
a tramp vessel which stopped at various ports, and which carried different cargoes benveen 
those ports, that these trips all constituted one voyage until the ship returned to the home 
port. 
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C. The Season Rule. As we have seen, time periods exist to 
carry out the policies of reasonable diligence and opportunity to 
enforce. The courts have not been hesitant in molding new rules 
to replace the voyage concept where necessary. On the Great Lakes 
the natural period is the season of navigation. There is mention 
of a season rule on the lakes at an early date.25 It was affirmatively 
established by Judge (later Supreme Court Justice) Henry B. 
Brown in The City of Tawas.26 After noting that there were 
other concepts such as strict time and voyage time, he said: 
"I regard it, however, as a reasonable modification of the 
general practice that claims of equal rank should be paid pro 
rata; that each year should be considered as a voyage, and that 
claims accruing the last year should be paid in preference to 
claims of the same rank accruing the year before, each season 
of navigation here being separated from the preceding season 
by four months of inaction. This will encourage diligence 
in the prosecution of claims, and prevent the proceeds of sale 
from being absorbed by dilatory creditors. But I know of no 
authority or principle which would justify the court in order-
ing a claim of inferior rank to be paid prior to claims of su-
perior rank, on the ground that the latter claim accrued the 
year before the former, unless the defence of stale claim is 
pleaded to the libel."27 
There has been no dissent from this view.28 The rule has been 
invoked in situations off the Great Lakes as well. In the Southern 
District of New York it was applied to a canal boat running be-
tween New York and Connecticut, perhaps for the reason that 
canals freeze over in winter as do the lakes.29 Despite the subse-
quent development of a special period for harbor vessels the season 
apparently is still the period for canal boats.30 There is some au-
thority for using it elsewhere when the physical circumstances for 
applying the rule are present. If the vessel's operation entails 
distinct seasons of activity, it is no doubt the most convenient time 
measurement to use.31 That does not mean that it will be used for 
fishing vessels merely because they operate by seasons, for there are 
25 Stillman v. The Buckeye State, (D.C. Mich. 1856) Fed. Cas. No. 13,445. 
26 (D.C. Mich. 1880) 3 F. 170 at 172, and ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §61 (1939). 
27 3 F. at 173. 
28 The Nebraska, (7th Cir. 1895) 69 F. 1009; The Oswego No. 2, (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 23 
F. Supp. 311, 1938 A.M.C. 980. 
29 The J. W. Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. 
30 The Brimstone, (2d. Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 106, 1934 A.M.C. 283. 
31 Dictum in The Alfred J. Murray, (D.C. Md. 1894) 60 F. 926; and The Steam Dredge 
A., (4th Cir. 1913) 204 F. 262, which is not very clearly reported. 
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other appropriate schemes. But where there is a long winter lay-up 
an argument could certainly be made to employ it.32 
It is clear that the rule envisages a number of consecutive sea-
sons, with corresponding priority, just as does the voyage rule. 
Even on the Great Lakes the rule will not be given automatic ap-
plication. Where the vessel was in actual navigation the year round 
it was held that the calendar year rule should be used instead.33 
D. The Calendar Year Rule. For fishing vessels and those 
in the coastwise trade the calendar year rule is the one most com-
monly selected. Apparently it was developed in the Massachusetts 
District where it has been utilized repeatedly.34 It has gained 
widespread acceptance on the Atlantic coast, and some recognition 
on the Pacific.35 Where it is applied it seems to cover vessels 
whose activity falls in between the trans-ocean and harbor types of 
operation.36 Some of the cases refer to a "year" rule, but in all of 
those the actual disposal of the liens is on a calendar year basis, a 
new period commencing on January 1st of each year.37 In only 
one case is a year alone taken as a time period, and that was a "year 
bef9re the disaster" rule, which seems a little spurious.38 
One problem which has come up in the administration of this 
rule is the treatment to be given to claims which overlap the year. 
This occurs where a running account is kept by a supplyman, or 
where work done under a repair contract covers the end of one 
32 As yet there are many districts in which the question has not been raised. 
33 The John J. Frietus, (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 252 F. 876. 
34 See, inter alia, The Philomena, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 200 F. 873; The Bethulia, (D.C. 
Mass. 1912) 200 F. 876; The Olive M. Williams, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1353; The 
Josephine&: Mary, (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1628. 
35 Rhode Island: The Evan N., (D.C. R. I. 1952) 109 F. Supp. 505, 1953 A.M.C. 576; 
Connecticut: In re New England Transportation Co., (D.C. Conn. 1914) 220 F. 203; Penn• 
sylvania: The John Cadwalader, (D.C. Pa. 1937) 1937 A.M.C. 395, affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 99 
F. (2d) 678, 1939 A.M.C. 52; Maryland: The Fort Gaines, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 438, 
1928 A.M.C. 459; The Little Charley, (D.C. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 120, 1929 A.M.C.. 398; 
The City of Athens, (D.C. Md. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 67, 1949 A.M.C. 572; Florida: The Od-
dyseus III, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 297, 1948 A.M.C. 608; Washington: University 
Nat. Bank v. The Home, (D.C. Wash. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 585; California: 
The Annette Rolph, (D.C. Cal. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 191, 1929 A.M.C. 212. 
36 It has been applied to a harbor tug in Buffalo, however. The John J. Frietus, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1918) 252 F. 876. 
37 The Little Charley, (D.C. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 120, 1929 A.M.C. 398; The Annette 
Rolph, (D.C. Cal. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 191, 1929 A.M.C. 212; University Nat. Bank v. The 
Home, (D.C. Wash. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 585. 
38 The Thomas Morgan, (D.C. S.C. 1903) 123 F. 781. By using this test, it appears 
that all liens were placed in parity so far as time was concerned. In Metlakatla Indian 
Community v. The Welcome, Civil Action No. 3329-KA (D.C. Alaska, 1st Div., 1953), the 
court, by an unreported mem6randum opinion, adopted a period of one year preceding 
the filing of the libel as the rule applicable to fishing vessels in Southeastern Alaska. No 
extensive treatment is given to the problem, and the language of the opinion is obscure. 
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year and the beginning of another. There is a tendency to say 
that when in doubt the lien shall be deemed to have accrued in 
the more recent year.39 Likewise, when payments have been made 
against a running account it is presumed that they were used to 
pay off the earliest items of indebtedness, thus throwing more of 
the claim into the later year.40 Wherever it has been adopted, the 
rule is taken to be one of successive calendar years, like the voyage 
and season rules.41 
E. The Forty-day Rule. In 1890 Judge Addison Brown an-
nounced the 40-day rule as the proper measure of time in the case 
of New York harbor vessels. The reason given for this was that it 
allowed for 30 days credit plu~ IO days notice, an ample period to 
preserve the time priority of any diligent lienor.42 The rule was 
later approved by the circuit court of appeals in The Samuel 
Little.43 This latter case also resolved a dispute between the East-
ern and Southern Districts on the question of whether the rule 
applied to liens of all types or only to supplies and necessaries.44 
The court stated45 that the rule governed liens of all classes, though 
operating only within each class. Subsequently the rule was 
adopted by the New Jersey District.46 Some believed that there 
should be successive periods, as with the voyage rule,47 but it was 
determined authoritatively that there is only one period of 40 days 
preceding the libel, and everything coming before that time shares 
39 The Fort Gaines, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 438, 1928 A.M.C. 459; The Little 
Charley, (D.C. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 120, 1929 A.M.C. 398. 
40 The Olive M. Williams, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1353; University Nat. Bank 
v. The Home, (D.C. Wash. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 585. 
41 See, inter alia, The Philomena, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 200 F. 873; The Bethulia, (D.C. 
Mass. 1912) 200 F. 876; The Olive M. Williams, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1353; The 
Josephine&: Mary, (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1628. Rhode Island: The Evan N., (D.C. 
R.I. 1952) 109 F. Supp. 505, 1953 A.M.C. 576; Connecticut: In re New England Transpor-
tation Co., (D.C. Conn. 1914) 220 F. 203; Pennsylvania: The John Cadwalader, (D.C. Pa. 
1937) 1937 A.M.C. 395, affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 678, 1939 A.l\f.C. 52; Maryland: 
The Fort Gaines, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 4-38, 1928 A.M.C. 4-59; The Little Charley, 
(D.C. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 120, 1929 A.M.C. 398; The City of Athens, (D.C. Md. 1949) 
83 F. Supp. 67, 1949 A.M.C. 572; Florida: The Oddyseus III, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 
297, 1948 A.M.C. 608; Washington: University Nat. Bank v. The Home, (D.C. Wash. 
1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 585; California: The Annette Rolph, (D.C. Cal. 1929) 
30 F. (2d) 191, 1929 A.M.C. 212. 
42The Proceeds of The Gratitude, (D.C. N.Y. 1890) 4-2 F. 299. 
43 (2d Cir. 1915) 221 F. 308 at 317. 
44 See The Glen Island, (D.C. N.Y. 1912) 194- F. 74-4, and The Towanda, (D.C. N.Y. 
1914-) 215 F. 232. 
45 The Samuel Little, (2d Cir. 1915) 221 F. 308 at 321. 
46 The Interstate No. 2, (D.C. N.J. 1922) 290 F. 1015. Previously the New Jersey 
District had taken a strict time approach to liens on harbor vessels. The America, (D.C. 
N.J. 1909) 168 F. 4-24-. 
47 The Leonard F. Richards, (D.C .. N.Y. 1916) 231 F. 1002. 
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pro rata in the remainder.48 There appear to be no cases adopting 
the rule for harbors other than New York.49 
F. The Ninety-day Rule. This rule was developed by Judge 
Neterer in The Edith50 as the Puget Sound equivalent of the New 
York harbor rule. It is intended to cover those situations "where 
vessels are operating from local harbors in the district, and from 
which they make daily or weekly trips," unless another reason to 
the contrary is present for not applying the rule.61 The court held 
in a later case that a vessel running between Seattle and Vancouver, 
B. C., is not covered by the rule.52 
There are still some unanswered questions about the 90-day 
rule. Is there only one time period, as in the 40-day rule, or are 
there successive periods? If priorities are established according to 
the realistic approach of Judge Addison Brown in The ]. W. 
Tucker" 3 and The Proceeds of The Gratitude,54 one period would 
seem to be enough, because once a lienor has failed to exercise his 
power of enforcement there is no reason for preferring him to 
others who have done-likewise. At the same time the calendar year 
rule, which is based upon an arbitrary length of time, operates by 
successive periods. The urge for uniformity would yield a similar 
result with the 90-day rule. There are indications that the calen-
dar year rule may prevail in Puget Sound cases where the 90-day 
or voyage rule is not in order.55 It still seems undetermined what 
vessels and what types of operation are to be included in the 90-
day rule. There are always some vessels that make a number of 
short trips followed by a long trip outside the Sound proper. How 
they should be classified must await a concrete case and a practical 
solution. 
G. Waiver of Priority. It is said generally that !aches, in the 
form of delay in pressing one's lien, is a defense to the claim itself, 
48 The Interstate No. 1, (2d Cir. 1923) 290 F. 926, 1923 A.M.C. 1118, cert. den. 262 
U.S. 753, 43 S.Gt. 701 (1923). There are earlier and later cases which adhere to this view. 
The Samuel Morris, (D.C. N.Y. 1894) 63 F. 736; The Oregon, (2d Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 968, 
1925 A.M.C. 1271; The Baker Brothers, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 920, 1928 A.M.C. 1600. 
49 It was rejected for Buffalo harbor in The John J. Frietus, (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 252 F. 
876. 
50 (D.C. Wash. 1914) 217 F. 300. The court used the technique of announcing the 
rule prospectively. 
51 Id. at 302. The rule was applied in The Sea Foam, (D.C. Wash. 1917) 243 F. 929. 
52 The Morning Star, (D.C. Wash. 1924) l F. (2d) 410. 
53 (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. 
54 (D.C. N.Y. 1890) 42 F. 299. 
55 University Nat. Bank v. The Home, (D.C. Wash. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 
585. 
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and it should be pleaded to the libel. Under that reasoning, once a 
decree of liability upon maritime liens is rendered, laches has 
nothing to do with the distribution of the fund.56 The priorities 
question properly should have no connection with matters of stale 
claim. As Judge Hough put it, "With liens judicially established, 
there was and is nothing for the doctrine of laches to operate 
upon."57 But without any express negation of this principle a 
doctrine of "waiver of priority" has crept into some of the cases.58 
The waiver is usually said to operate in favor of another lien of 
either the same or lower class. No doubt the courts are conscious 
of the idea that distribution and marshalling is of an "equitable" 
nature. It is because priority would be unfair under the circu~ 
stances of the case that a waiver is found. 
In The Morning Stai59 Judge Neterer said that crewmen who 
allowed their claims to mount up for more than six months should 
be postponed to later supplymen because of laches. Equity and 
good conscience required that those who knew of the vessel's shaky 
financial condition, and who delayed enforcement, should be 
deemed to have deferred their priority. This case was followed in 
The James W. Follette,60 where certain wage claimants were placed 
below others, though still superior to tort. Other earlier cases 
were also relied upon as authorizing a waiver of priority. Some of 
these actually adopt a "time over class" approach,61 while another62 
held that laches by a supplyman put his claim below all others and 
would have barred it totally had not the owner admitted liability 
on the claim. The only other case cited in support of the doc-
trine63 is quite brief and not at all clear, though it can be explained 
simply as an application of the voyage rule.64 
The effect of recognizing a doctrine of implied waiver is to put 
a fourth possible hurdle in the path of the lienor. In any case he 
56 This was the view of Judge Henry B. Brown in The City of Tawas, (D.C. Mich. 
1880) 3 F. 170 at 172. Laches in the field of maritime liens is a rather fluid concept. See 
generally ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §55 (1939). 
57 The Oregon, (2d Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 968 at 970, 1925 A.M.C. 1271. 
58 This is distinct from waiver of the lien itself, for which there is clear authority. 
The President Arthur, 279 U.S. 564, 49 S.Ct. 420 (1929). 
159 (D.C. Wash. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 410. 
60 (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525. 
61 The Dubuque, (D.C. Mich. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 4,110; The Amos D. Carver, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1888) 35 F. 665. The Dubuque said that a pilot waived the lien by a delay of more 
than a season. The Amos D. Carver did say that !aches caused the lien to be superseded 
by later ones, but it also contains some "time over class" language. 
62 The Wexford, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 674. 
63 The John T. Williams, (D.C. Conn. 1901) 107 F. 750. 
64 The district court in which the James 1V. Follette was decided has held more 
recently that !aches is only a defense and cannot be raised in the distribution stage of the 
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must pass the tests of laches, time priority, and class rank. When 
one more element of a highly flexible nature is added, the result 
is more uncertain than ever. One of the less attractive features of 
the waiver doctrine is that it injects an additional time element 
into a system which already has laid down definite criteria of time: 
the various voyage, season, calendar year, and harbor rules. The 
time rules themselves, while not connected with laches, in prac-
tical effect operate as a principle of quasi-laches. By definition 
there is no priorities problem unless the fund is insufficient. The 
ultimate question is: who among these claimants has the fewer 
equities in his favor? The answer of the courts has· been to set up 
objective standards in the interests of certainty: laches, time, and 
class. The danger of the waiver doctrine is that it_ interposes sub-
jective methods of preference while paying formal respect to the 
objective. standards which have evolved into an elaborate but 
knowable system.65 
It would not be fitting to leave this topic without noting that 
some of the cases are either so contrary a view of the law or so 
loosely worded that they might best be discarded as lacking any 
practical value. Occasionally it has been suggested that the prior-
ity of filing the libels should affect the outcome, 66 but this has been 
repudiated by the other authorities.67 The only importance at-
tached to the time of the libel is that time periods are reckoned 
backwards from it. Other cases illustrate the confusion or con-
tradiction which results from trying to state priority rules in an 
unduly contracted form.68 
case. The Oswego No. 2, (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 311, 1938 A.M.C. 980, in which 
repairs and supplies over a four-year period were not barred, the owner having failed to 
object to the liens as such. But see National Shawmut Bank v. The Winthrop, (D.C. 
Mass. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 370, in which the court held that laches only postponed the liens 
to other claims. In this latter case the court determined laches as of the time of filing a 
preferred ship mortgage which intervened between several of the claims. 
65 An entirely different question is whether the lienor can expressly waive his priority. 
To say that he can is an entirely salutary principle. A preferred ship mortgagee may 
desire to have repairs made on the vessel, and if he represents to the repairman that he 
will not assert his priority it would be harsh to deny a waiver. So held in The John 
Cadwalader, (D.C. Pa. 1937) 1937 A.M.C. 395. 
66The Globe, (C.C. N.Y. 1852) Fed. Cas. No. 5,483. 
67 The City of Tawas, (D.C. Mich. 1880) 3 F. 170; The J. W. Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 
20 F. 129; The Arcturus, (D.C. Ohio 1883) 18 F. 743; The Fanny, (D.C. Mass. 1876) Fed. Cas. 
No. 4,638; The Lady Boone, (D.C. Ark. 1884) 21 F. 731; The Julia, (D.C. S.C. 1893) 57 
F. 233. 
68 The Belize (Rubin Iron Works v. Johnson), (5th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 871, 1939 
A.M.C. 27; The J. R. Hardee, (D.C. Tex. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 379, 1952 A.M.C. 1124; The 
Thomas Morgan, (D.C. S.C. 1903) 123 F. 781. 
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II. CLASS AND !Ts CRITERIA 
In handling priorities measured by the character of the lien 
itself, the courts have worked out a spectrum of classes which are 
said to rank one another. In the past there was much controversy 
over how many categories there should be, how they should rank, 
and what liens fell into the respective classes. The recent cases 
exhibit a comforting stabilization of the number of classes and 
their relationship inter se. The chief problems today are those 
of classification of the liens to determine into what rank they 
should fall. · 
A popular and much-quoted statement of the main classes and 
their comparative positions is that made by Judge Coleman in The 
William Leishear,69 though it would not be completely acceptable 
to some admiralty jurists either then or now: 
"Generally speaking, the law of maritime liens may be 
said to be made up of exceptions to the above doctrine, which 
gives priority to the lien latest in point of time, so that to-day 
it is possible to deduce, from the decisions, the following order 
of priority, existing irrespective of time, which represents the 
weight of authority: (I) Seamen's wages; (2) salvage; (3) 
tort and collision liens; (4) repairs, supplies, towage, wharf-
age, pilotage, and other necessaries; (5) bottomry bonds in 
inverse order of application; (6) non-maritime claims. This, 
however, is no more than a very general statement, since any 
summary is subject to further exceptions of more or less nar-
row application."70 
It should be noted that court costs and the costs of preserving 
the ship pending suit may be preferred even to the maritime 
claims. There is also the preferred ship mortgage to be consid-
ered. It is a creature of statute and occupies a position granted 
by its maker. It has introduced a common law notion of time 
priority to a limited but important extent. 
The theory of class priority is simple. It consists of the idea 
that some liens have an inherent merit or comparative righteous-
ness which entitles them to a preference. 
In deciding l:4at some claims by their nature and the circum-
stances out of which they arise are entitled to a preference, the 
courts use fundamental notions of policy regarding maritime com-
merce. The high rank of seamen's wage liens is usually justified 
69 (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770. 
10 Id. at 86!1. 
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by saying that commerce would not take place without men to 
man the ships, and that the men will not sign on without a trust-
worthy security for wages. Or resort may be had to the relatively 
unprotected situation of seamen, and their inability to learn the 
solvency of the vessel owner.71 But if the rationalizing factor is 
commerce and the furtherance of commerce, the other liens are 
justifiable on that ground too. The rank of salvage is said to rest 
on the need to encourage the saving of maritime ventures, collision 
liens are desirable because they promote safety in navigation, and 
the contracts for necessaries facilitate credit to the vessel. 
It can be seen that these justifications in themselves rest ·upon 
certain major premises or unstated assumptions which may raise 
doubt by persons of critical bent. The assumptions are beliefs 
about human conduct. The notion that seamen would hesitate 
to sign on were it not for the high security of their wage lien may 
have been a fairly valid generalization at one time. Certainly 
under the conditions of medieval shipping, or even in the days of 
the clipper ships, the element of "venture" was a highly realistic 
one. Each voyage was something of a separate entity, usually for 
a separate and distinct purpose, as contrasted with modern systems 
of transportation. With the strong unionization of seafaring men, 
and the present system of paying wages and allotments, it is at least 
questionable today whether the wage lien priority is a prime in-
ducement to men signing on the ships. It is certainly desirable, 
but is it of the utmost necessity? 
One might question the practical utility of favoring collision 
liens over those for repairs and supplies. Is it true in actuality 
that this encourages safety in navigation? In the first place, the 
supplymen have no control over the way the vessel is run, and to 
say that as "owners" they take the risk of collision is only to use a 
fiction in place of explanation. As Justice Holmes might say, a 
fiction is not a fact.72 In the second place, the persons immediately 
responsible for safe navigation are the officers and crew of a vessel. 
Their motivation in avoiding collisions most likely has nothing to 
do with maritime liens. The care and prudence which they ob-
serve is more likely to stern from the fear that negligence will re-
sult in discharge by the company, that their reputations will be 
hurt, that finding re-employment will be difficult; and that the 
Coast Guard inspectors will revoke their licenses. There is also 
71 See Norris, "The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty," 52 MICH. L. REv. 479 (1954). 
72 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 at 433, 42 S.Ct. 159 (1922). 
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the positive interest in observing the rules of the road, the profes-
sional pride in skillful shiphandling, and the humane desire to 
avoid tragic and wasteful accidents. 
This is not to say that the present system of priorities is un-
reasonable or untenable, though it does seem a little presump-
tuous to base a priorities rule on the idea that some abstract bene-
fit to commerce will flow from it. The only point to be made is 
that we are not working with verifiable propositions. It is quite 
possible that class priorities are based to a certain extent upon 
even less tangible reasons. In fact the idea of "inherent merit" 
as a reason for class ranking would seem to contain a referent to 
the emotional feelings of the court. 
Surely the traditional solicitude for seamen comes into play in 
determining what their rank ought to be, apart from any notions 
of furthering commerce. There is an admiration for the humani-
tarian conduct of salvors, just as there is an appealing quality about 
the tort claimant, asking redress for a wrong done to him without 
his consent. Is it not possible that supplymen may be put on a 
lower plane because their interest is more definitely mercantile in 
character, with fewer moral and emotional overtones? This is not 
said in criticism but only by way of pointing out that there may be 
a variety of policies to be invoked in any priorities case. That is 
indicated by the wide divergence of holdings in this field. It 
would seem that class rank is not entirely based on necessity. 
A. Wages. Seamen have long enjoyed a high rank of priority 
for their wages. In The Paragon73 Judge Ware put it upon the 
civil law principle that "he shall be preferred who has contributed 
most immediately to the preservation of the thing."74 And in the 
early case of Sheppard v. Taylor75 appears the language which has 
become hallowed by repetition, that wages adhere to the last plank 
of the ship. The general benevolence toward seamen is clear. 
I. Penalty wages. The concept of what are wages would seem 
fairly straightfonvard. But there are problems in classification 
even here. Obviously the pay contracted for and due is wages. 
Not so obvious is the matter of "penalty wages," so-called, which 
are due under 46 U.S.C., section 596.76 The question is whether 
73 (D.C. Me. 1836) Fed. Cas. No. 10,708. 
74 Id. at p. 1088. 
75 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 675 (1831). 
76 Failure to pay wages within the time stated in the statute and without sufficient 
cause subjects the master or owner to an extra payment of double wages for each day's 
delay. 
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sums due under the statute should be given wage priority or 
relegated to some other position. In Covert v. Wexford11 it was 
held that penalty wages, given under a British statute similar to 
our own, were part of the wage lien and should be given the cor-
responding priority. The words of the act that the sum "shall be 
recovered as wages" were taken as an implication that the ship 
should be bound. To give other than first priority would be to 
defeat the purpose of the law. Furthermore, the shipping articles 
are sjgned with reference to existing law, which is imported into 
the contract. This case was followed in Gerber v. Spencer,18 
which went further and said that the statutory sum is not really a 
penalty. Rather it is in the nature of compensation for the delay 
in payment, and as such it is an incident to the claim for wages. 
The court pointed out that delay in payment involved economic 
detriment tp the men, and they needed the extra money in order 
to make good the disadvantage to which they had been put. The 
fact that the owner was unable to pay promptly because he was in 
financial difficulties was deemed no excuse. The attitude would 
seem to be that the owner should exhaust all means of raising 
money to see that this prime obligation is fulfilled. 
Other cases have not handled this claim quite so tenderly. In 
The Nika19 Judge Neterer was in favor of giving it a high position, 
though not that of regular wages. Instead he put it just below 
salvage, though superior to all other liens. The frequency of 
penalty wages arising has been greatly inhibited by more recent 
rulings of the Supreme Court80 which say that the sum is not to be 
assessed where the failure to pay is due to the vessel being arrested 
for claims beyond its value.81 By its own terms the statute does 
not apply where "sufficient cause" is shown. There has been a 
tendency to read the statute restrictively, or rather it has resulted 
through proper application in disallowance of a number of 
claims.82 There are indications that penalty wages will be de-
ferred to other liens for lack of due diligence. This was done in 
77 (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 3 F. 577, affd. in The Wexford, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 674. 
78 (9th Cir. 1922) 278 F. 886. 
79 (D.C. Wash. 1923) 287 F. 717, 1923 A.M.C. 409. 
so Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 50 S.Ct. 189 (1930), which construed the term 
"sufficient cause"; and McCrea v. United States, 294 U.S. 23, 55 S.Ct. 291 (1935), which says 
no recovery shall be had unless the delay in payment is arbitrary, willful, or unreasonable. 
81 The claim was disallowed for this reason in The City of Athens, (D.C. Md. 1949) 
83 F. Supp. 67, 1949 A.M.C. 572; The Herbert L. Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 
156, 1944 A.M.C. 222; The Eastern Shore, (D.C. Md. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 964, 1940 A.M.C. 
388. 
S2Ibid. 
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one case where the seaman had waited almost two months after 
discharge without asserting his claim.83 The lien was valid but 
through a waiver of priority it was placed below the supplymen. 
It is still open to argument that where the sum has accrued some-
time before the vessel is libelled or where the delay is arbitrary, it 
should be recovered with the same priority as wages. Unless the 
claim is defeated on the merits, the reasoning of Covert v. Wex-
ford84 would seem to remain unimpaired. 
2. Seamen's remedies. The lien for maintenance and cure 
has been given wage priority on the theory that it is an integral 
part of the contract for wages and a material ingredient in the 
compensation of seamen.85 The question of what rank should be 
given to the seaman's claim for damages due to the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel has seldom been considered. One court gave it a 
tort priority86 on the ground that unlike maintenance and cure it 
is a claim of fairly recent origin, it does not arise solely from the 
seaman's contract, and it could be invoked by anyone lawfully 
aboard the vessel who is injured by defects of hull and equipment. 
It might be asked why, by reasoning analogous to that in Covert v. 
Wexford,87 the claim for unseaworthiness should not be consid-
ered part of the wages. If a seaman's contract is made with ref-
erence to existing law, and the existing law grants a remedy for 
unseaworthiness, it could be said that the contract of employment 
imports compensation for the unseaworthiness of the vessel as well 
as for maintenance and cure and statutory penalties. That he 
should be indemnified for such injuries is an integral part of the 
seaman's relationship to the vessel. The right was formulated 
consciously in The Osceola,88 in which it was said, " ... in every 
contract of service, express or implied, between an owner of a 
ship and the master or any seaman thereof, there is an obligation 
implied that all reasonable means shall be used to insure the sea-
worthiness of the ship before and during the voyage."89 
83 The Morning Star, (D.C. Wash. 1924) I F. (2d) 410. This was the same court that 
in The Nika, (D.C. Wash. 1923) 287 F. 717, 1923 A.M.C. 409, where there was no lack of 
diligence, put the lien just below salvage. 
84 (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 3 F. 577, affd. in The Wexford, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 674. 
85 The James W. Follette, (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525; The Josephine & Mary, 
(D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1628; and The Washington, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 296 F. 158, 
in which return passage money and indemnity for loss of seaman's personal property were 
also held to be in the category of wages. The courts have been influenced by the benevo-
lent language of Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon, (C.C. Me. 1823) Fed. Cas. No. 6,047. 
86 The James W. Follette, (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525. 
87 (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 3 F. 577. 
88 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483 (1903). 
89Id. at 171. 
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Thus it was thought to be a "warranty'' of a contractual char-
acter. It has been suggested that a warranty theory was used in 
order to avoid common law tort limitations of negligence and con-
tributory fault.90 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in extending 
the doctrine in 1945 to cover a longshoreman injured on the vessel, 
rejected the contractual notion and placed liability on a relational 
basis. ~he Court said, "It is a fopn of absolute duty owing to all 
within the range of its humanitarian policy."91 The recent ex-
tension of the principle to cover a carpenter employed by a third 
party and injured while working aboard the vessel92 would seem 
to point even more to a tort basis. The Court at one point calls it 
a maritime tort.93 This certainly provides a logical argument for 
denominating unseaworthiness a species of liability without fault, 
in the nature of tort.94 On the other hand, it might still be said 
that so far as priorities are concerned the claim should be granted 
as wages. It could be said to arise out of the seaman's contract, 
even though the basis is not contractual in regard to others. 
Logical consistency may not always be the desideratum in ad-
justing lien priorities, however. To· rank unseaworthiness. as wages 
may be to defeat salvage in some cases, and it may even result in 
diminution of the claims for straight wages in a case where the 
90 Justice Rutledge in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 at 93, 66 S.Ct. 872 
(1946). 
91 Id. at 95. 
92 Pope &: Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202 (1953). 
93 Id. at 409. It should be noted that strong dissents in both this case and the Sieracki 
case, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946), protested the extension because they believed that 
the remedy was one arising upon the breach of warranty to the seaman, a warranty exist• 
ing by virtue of the peculiar hazards to which seamen are exposed. In a much discussed 
case, Keen v. Overseas Tank Corp., (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 515, Judge Hand's sole 
concern is with the scope of the warranty of seaworthiness, and the terminology of insur-
ance law is utilized throughout. See also Judge Hand's refusal to apply the warranty to 
a workman sent aboard ship to clean tanks in Guerrini v. United States, (2d Cir. 1948) 
167 F. (2d) 352. 
94 No doubt an attempt will be made to say that the Hawn Case, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 
202 (1953), is in line with the traditional doctrine because the carpenter went aboard the 
vessel to repair a grain loading device, and that this can be bro~ght under the rubric of 
"traditional seaman's work." The seaman's work doctrine is used to give seamen's reme-
dies to non-crew members on the ground that the employer should not be allowed to avoid 
liability by getting landsmen or subcontractors to do seamen's work while the vessel is in 
port. See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19 (1926), where 
a longshoreman was declared to be a seaman under the Jones AcL This doctrine was 
revitalized and heavily relied upon in the Sieracki case, 328 U.S. 85 at 93, but as the dissent 
in the Hawn case pointed out, the majority opinion in this latter case virtually ignores 
the seamen's work doctrine.• To say that the Hawn case is in line with the previous 
decisions is merely to play with words and not to face the substance of the matter. See 
also the dissent in Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct. 601 (1954), 
which extends unseaworthiness to a longshoreman's injuries owing to a defective snatch 
block which was brought aboard by the contracting stevedore. 
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fund is not large enough to satisfy even those. It would amount 
to holding the other seamen's wages liable for contribution to a 
liability which is not theirs but that of the owner. The element of 
personal injury connotes tortious rather than contractual liability 
to the judicial mind. There is also a natural tendency for the 
court to allow something to other claims instead of having the en-
tire res swallowed by one class.95 
3. Other wage claims. In the Massachusetts District, where 
fishermen work for "lays" or shares of the catch it is the practice to 
grant their claims as wages and to give them priority as such.96 
The bonus pay given for wartime merchant marine service has 
also been granted wage priority.97 An interesting case on its facts 
is a bankruptcy proceeding in which the referee allowed a pref-
erence to the sums due under a union job security clause. The 
collective bargaining contract called for eleven months pay in the 
event of involuntary layoffs. The company went into receivership, 
and the referee gave effect to the extra pay as wages.98 
Where a watchman's lien is granted there is a tendency to rec-
ognize it as equivalent to that of a seaman.99 The cases in which 
it has been granted have not been ones in which many classes were 
in competition, so the law remains a little uncertain on the point. 
In some instances it has been given a rank with necessaries.100 But 
as one court pointed out,1°1 the lien is so difficult to obtain that in 
order to give rise to it at all the services would have to be such as 
contribute to the navigation of the vessel, or for seamanlike work. 
In fact the watchmen of a live vessel are likely to be certificated 
and licensed men sent down from the hiring hall. Logic would 
appear to favor a wage rank where the service is seamanlike in 
nature.102 There is always the possibility of the watchman getting 
95 There is no priority problem for Jones Act claims, of course, because no lien is 
given. Plamals v. The Pinar del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 48 S.Ct. 457 (1928). 
96 The Juneal, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1284; The Olive M. Williams, (D.C. 
Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1353; The Helen M., (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 587. 
97 The Herbert L. Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 156, 1944 A.M.C. 222. 
98 Matter of Southern Pacific Golden Gate Ferries, Ltd., (D.C. Cal. 1942) 1942 A.M.C. 
1581. 
99 The Hattie Thomas, (D.C. Conn. 1894) 59 F. 297; The Joseph Nixon, (D.C. Pa. 
1890) 43 F. 926; The Seguranca, (D.C. N.Y. 1893) 58 F. 908; The Erinagh, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 
7 F. 231. 
100 The Estrada Palma, (D.C. La. 1923) 8 F. (2d) 103, 1923 A.M.C. 1040; The Olive 
M. Williams, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1353; The Herbert L. Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 
1944) 55 F. Supp. 156, 1944 A.M.C. 222. 
101 The Seguranca, (D.C. N.Y. 1893) 58 F. 908. 
102 In The Hattie Thomas, (D.C. Conn. 1894) 59 F. 297, the court said by way of 
dictum that if the watchman's lien was for a seamanlike service it should have a wage rank, 
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a high priority where he renders service to a vessel after arrest, not 
as a wage claim but as "costs." The Supreme Court has said that 
wharfage claims arising while the vessel was in custodia legis 
should be granted a preference over the various maritime liens as 
a necessary incident to the administration of the fund.103 By 
analogy this should extend to watchmen whose services are im-
pliedly or expressly authorized by the Court. In one case104 the 
seamen themselves got high priority as watchmen after the vessel 
had been arrested. This was granted as "costs" because the 
marshal did not protest their remaining aboard.105 
Not all tasks done on a vessel by the regular crew will be given 
a high priority, however. Work done by the ship's engineers while 
the vessel was in port between trips,· under the direction of shore 
engineers, has been put in the class of repairs and supplies.106 But 
the court was careful to distinguish this from the case where sea-
men did work in port which was part of their contractual duties.107 
It is in the area of seamen's wages that the onslaught of the waiver 
of priority doctrine has been felt most severely. For a variety of 
reasons the court may feel it inequitable to give the seamen first 
rank. Failure to assert the claim promptly may amount to post-
ponement of it to that of supplymen.108 In some cases the courts 
may have been a little hasty in dropping the claim to a lower posi-
tion. Especially in the small vessels a man is likely to stay with the 
vessel in the hope that she will earn her freight and be able to 
make good out of the proceeds. If jobs are hard to find, the sea-
man may be reluctant to press for pay the moment it is due. He 
and by the same reasoning if the service was that of a landsman it should be classed with 
repairs and supplies. 
103 The Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 47 S.Ct. 482, 1927 A.M.C. 723 (1927). This preference 
was granted neither as a maritime lien (for none could arise after arrest) nor in the 
technical sense as an equitable lien (for equitable remedies supposedly are not available 
in admiralty), but rather as an application of equitable principles in the distribution of 
the res. 
104The General Geo. W. Goethals, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 183. 
105 However, in The Herbert L. Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 156, 1944 
A.M.C. 222, the court cited The General Geo. W. Goethals, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 
183, but placed similar services of the seamen in a class below the preferred mortgage lien. 
100 The Juneal, (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 1284. 
101 The Helen M., (D.C. Mass. 1932) 1932 A.M.C. 587, also held work done beyond 
regular crewmen's duties to be in the necessaries class. 
10s In The Morning Star, (D.C. Wash. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 410, a delay of six months was 
sufficient for waiver. The court spoke of "!aches" but did not bar the claim absolutely. 
The effect was the same, of course. As to penalty wages the court put the seaman junior 
to the supplymen because he had waited almost two months before making his claim. 
Again the court said the lien was valid, but could not take top priority because of the 
lack of due diligence. 
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might prefer working, with room and board provided, to "sitting 
on the beach." In one such case the conduct of certain crew mem-
bers was held to be inequitable as to other seamen in that they con-
tinued working and allowed their claims to mount up.109 
The stevedore's lien, when it arises,110 is not difficult to assign. 
Where it is the lien of a stevedore who contracts to provide specific 
ships with cargo handling services, it should fall into the category 
of repairs and supplies.111 But where it is the lien of the individual 
longshoreman who does the work, which might be the case in 
smaller ports, it should properly be classed as wages.112 This 
would seem to follow from the principle of the Haverty case113 
that longshoremen are "seamen" in certain respects.114 
The pilotage lien also fits into fairly neat divisions. It is 
viewed sometimes as in a class with supplies and other neces-
saries, probably on the theory that it is a contract which benefits 
the vessel in the same manner as the contract of towage, and that it 
is not wages because the pilot is somewhat like an independent con-
tractor.115 That might be true of harbor and bar pilots who re-
main aboard only a short time. But even then there is compensa-
tion for a personal service performed by a skilled mariner, and it 
is not extravagant to say that his claim is in the nature of wages.11 6 
Where the pilot is carried in a full-time capacity as a permanent 
member of the crew, as in much of the coastwise and river trade, 
his services are most certainly wages.117 But if his real duties are 
109 The James W. Follette, (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525. It should be noted 
that the deferred crewmen were also members of the owner's family. Though junior to 
other seamen they were still placed ahead of tort claimants, although that point was 
academic in view of the exhaustion of the fund. 
110 No lien granted in The E. A. Barnard, (D.C. Pa. 1880) 2 F. 712; The Esteban de 
Antunano, (C.C. La. 1887) 31 F. 920; The Henry W. Breyer, (D.C. Md. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 
423, 1927 A.M.C. 290, where it was disallowed because of contract with the owner. But 
see The Canada, (D.C. Ore. 1881) 7 F. 119, where the lien was granted, relying on the 
language of The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 666 (1873). 
111 The Canada, (D.C. Ore. 1881) 7 F. 119. 
112This is suggested in the dictum in The Henry W. Breyer, (D.C. Md. 1927) 17 F. 
(2d) 423, 1927 A.M.C. 290. 
113 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19 (1926). 
114 The principle of the Haverty case was thought to be superseded by the passage of 
The Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Act of 1927, 33 U.S.C. (1952) §901 et seq., but 
has undergone a striking parthogenesis in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 
S.Ct. 872 (1946). 
115 Allowed as necessaries in The Estrada Palma, (D.C. La. 1923) 8 F. (2d) 103, 1923 
A.M.C. 1040. The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 666 (1873), put pilotage with neces-
saries, but the real issue there was common law liens against maritime liens. 
116 In The Alexander Barkley, (D.C. N.Y. 1894) 83 F. 846, the reasoning seems to 
proceed along that course because were it otherwise the pilotage should have been placed 
junior to the collision claim. 
117 The Dubuque, (D.C. Mich. 1870) Fed Cas. No. 4,110. See also the dictum in The 
Willamette Valley, (D.C. Cal. 1896) 76 F. 838, and Collyer v. S. S. Favorite, (D.C. N.Y. 
1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1051. 
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those of a master, or if he acts as a combination master and pilot, 
the courts will pierce through the title and declare that he has no 
lien.118 It is well settled that the master has no lien for his 
wages.119 The courts have hinted, however, that if the services as 
pilot can be segregated properly from those as master they will be 
entitled to a lien, and presumably wage priority.120 Nor is it only 
through claiming pilotage that the master has attempted to obtain 
lien priority against the vessel. If the law of the flag allows a lien 
for master's wages, it is usually granted by American forums.121 
But it is deferred to supplymen with whom he contracted person-
ally,122 and to liens for collisions in which he is at fault.123 Like 
others who advance their own funds to discharge maritime liens, he 
may be subrogated to the rights of those whom he pays with his 
own money.124 One case125 indulges in legal semantics to arrive 
at the conclusion that a ferryboat captain is not a "master," but 
only a foreman, and thus entitled to a lien with wage priority. 
4. The rank of wages. Having now examined what types of 
claims may be allowed as wages and given that rank, the inquiry 
turns to the question of how wages stand with respect to other 
classes. It was early established in our history that wages should 
occupy a most favored position. This was accomplished by 
analogizing freely from medieval sea codes and from the practice 
in civil law countries.126 This high position has become confirmed 
118 The Willamette Valley and Collyer v. S. S. Favorite, note 117 supra. 
119 The Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 175 (1837). 
120 Collyer v. S. S. Favorite, (D.C. N.Y. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1051, and The Willamette 
Valley, (D.C. Cal. 1896) 76 F. 838. In the latter case the segregation of the two services 
was held inadequate because the master could only show that he was paid a certain extra 
amount for acting as pilot. It is bard to see how a proper segregation can be made as a 
practical matter. Even while piloting the man is theoretically still in charge as master. 
Perhaps the skipper could change uniform and pipe himself aboard whenever the vessel 
is coming into close waters. 
121 The Estrada Palma, (D.C. La. 1923) 8 F. (2d) 103, 1923 A.M.C. 1040 (Cuban law); 
.The Fort Gaines, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 438, 1928 A.M.C. 459 (Norwegian law); The 
Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 247 (British law). 
122 The Fort Gaines, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 438, 1928 A.M.C. 459; The Olga, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1887) 32 F. 329. 
123 The Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 247. 
124The Olga, (D.C. N.Y. 1887) 32 F. 329. 
125 Matter of Southern Pacific Golden Gate Ferries, Ltd., (D.C. Cal. 1942) 1942 A.M.C. 
1581. The Holmes statement that words are flexible and the jurisprudential utterances 
of Cardozo and Jerome Frank are mustered in support of the result here. The conclusion 
is reached that if a bartender has a lien as a "seaman" the ferryboat captain ought to 
have one also. 
126 Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 675 (1831), and The Paragon, (D.C. Mass. 
1836) Fed. Cas. No. 10,708. 
1956] MARITIME LIEN PRIORITIES 801 
through habit and repetition to the point where it is an irrefrag-
able principle of distribution.121 
One of the more contentious issues is the position which wages 
should occupy in respect to salvage.· In the case of The Elizabeth 
& J ane128 the ship had wrecked upon the shore and the crew had 
abandoned it totally. It was later salvaged. Judge Ware ruled 
that the seamen could not claim their wages, but he allowed the 
salvor's lien. The theory of the case is that the right to wages is 
connected with the safety of the ship, and as long as the crew stand 
by the wreck, even on shore, they have their lien. When they de-· 
part physically from the scene, it amounts to a legal abandonment 
of the venture.129 This was not a determination of priority but of 
existence of the lien. The court said by way of dictum that if the 
seamen had a wage lien it would be superior to salvage. The hold-
ing of the case is in danger of being generalized, however, as a 
precedent for giving top priority to salvage. Some courts have 
read the English cases as requiring that result.130 The notion is 
that salvage has more to do with preservation of the res than does 
the labor of seamen. It is usually phrased in terms of a preference 
over wages earned up till the point when the salvor arrives on the 
scene.131 Other courts have accepted the doctrine of The Eliza-
beth & Jane132 that only a complete abandonment and loss of the 
lien will affect the high priority of wages.133 To hold wages prior 
in all cases, where there is a lien at all,134 is certainly more con-
sonant with the idea that class rank is the predominant method of 
alignment. To hold otherwise is to say that class rank is qualified 
by the contingencies of the voyage, that the seamen must gamble 
on the strength of the ship's equipment and the skill of the master, 
121 The G. F. Brown, (D.C. Conn. 1885) 24 F. 399; Saylor v. Taylor, (4th Cir. 1896) 77 
F. 476; Provost v. The Selkirk, (D.C. Ohio 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 11,455; .The America, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288; The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 
1927 A.M.C. 1770; The James W. Follette, (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525. 
128 (D.C. Me. 1823) Fed. Cas. No. 8,321. 
129 The court looked to the English, United States, and European sources of the time 
but found them all somewhat equivocal on this point. 
130 The Athenian, (D.C. Mich. 1877) 3 F. 248; The Nika, (D.C. Wash. 1923) 287 F. 
717, 1923 A.M.C. 409. 
1s1 Ibid. 
132 (D.C. Me. 1823) Fed. Cas. No. 8,321. 
133 Provost v. The Selkirk, (D.C. Ohio 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 11,455, is frequently cited 
for salvage over wages, but actually it is there limited to cases of abandonment. The E. M. 
Davidson, (D.C. Wis. 1880) 1 F. 259, maintains the same distinction, holding wages over 
salvage. 
134 The Lillie Laurie, (C.C. Tex. 1880) 50 F. 219; The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 
1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770 (dictum). 
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and that notions of strict time priority will be injected within the 
period rule which would otherwise be controlling. In any event, 
the talk of preferring those who most immediately preserve the res 
is of little moment, for without a crew the vessel would never leave 
port, and there would be no occasion for a salvage service. As a 
practical matter, the seamen have preserved the vessel for the salvor 
as much as he has done so for them. 
Similar to the problem just discussed is that of wages and col-
lision claims. In Norwich Co. v. Wright185 the Supreme Court 
·quoted the following language from an English text: "Liens for 
reparation for wrong done are superior to any prior liens for 
money borrowed, wages, pilotage, etc. But they stand on an 
equality with regard to each other if they arise from the same 
cause."136 The statement was gratuitous and unnecessary, but it 
gave rise to decisions which preferred tort to wages earned before 
the tort.137 In The F. H. Stanwood138 the court fastened upon 
this dictum and gave extended reasons for its application. First, 
the seamen share in the fault of the vessel by imputation. 
"The negligent navigation causing collision and conse-
quent injury was the act of the crew, or of some one or more 
of them. The negligent act or omission is, in the law, charged 
upon the vessel so negligently navigated. She is treated as the 
offending thing. The fault of the crew is visited upon the 
agent by which the fault became effective, causing injury. It 
is an instance of imputed guilt, the sin of the crew being at-
tributed to the innocent instrument. So, also, we think that, 
as to the injured vessel, the crew should share in the fault 
imputed to the offending vessel. As to the injured vessel, the 
offending thing and her crew are one. The crew participate 
in the navigation of the ship. She is the passive instrument 
of the active co-operation in effecting the injury. Ship and 
crew constit1;1te the common enemy that has worked destruc-
tion. There may be but one directing mind. The others are, 
however, like the ship, his instruments in the perpetration 
of the wrong, and, as to the injured vessel, participants in 
the fault. They are joint tort-feasors. Which one, inter se, 
was directly and immediately responsible for the negligent 
act or negligent omission is of no moment to the vessel in-
jured through their co-operation."139 
13513 Wall. (80 U.S.) 104 (1871). 
136 Id. at 122. 
137 The Maria & Elizabeth, (D.C. N.J. 1882) 12 F. 627. 
138 (7th Cir. 1892) 49 F. 577. 
139 Id. at 578. 
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The court said it would be contrary to natural justice to allow 
wage priority and thereby encourage negligence. Secondly, the 
court applied equitable marshalling principles, remitting the sea-
men to a personal action against a solvent owner, a remedy which 
was not available to the tort claimants. 
The decision seems patently unjust. To erect a doctrine of 
imputed fault in such cases is to employ thought processes more 
fitting in medieval than in modern life. To call the crew joint 
tortfeasors as a matter of law is practically to make them conspira-
tors. In truth most crew members have no choice whatever over 
the manner in which the vessel is navigated. They merely follow 
orders from the bridge. The probable effect of the imputed fault 
doctrine would be not to encourage safety in navigation as much 
as to stir up argument and disorder among the crew whenever the 
ship is in danger of collision. The resort of the men to a remedy 
in personam also leaves much to be desired. The owner might be-
come insolvent after the proceeds had been distributed to the tort 
claimant. The seamen may have to bear the burden of further 
costs and proceedings. Nonetheless the Stanwood has been used 
as a basis for decision.140 
The better method would be to adjudicate actual fault in each 
case and defer to the tort claim only those individuals who are in 
fact blameworthy. That is the method which has evolved in the 
courts of the New York District and elsewhere.141 They have re-
jected the argument that the seamen have a solvent owner from 
whom to collect,142 and each case has determined individual fault 
on its merits.143 There are still other cases which use broad lan-
guage to the effect that wages are always preferred to tort, but it is 
not clear whether the question of individual responsibility was 
raised in those instances.144 The rational approach would be 
clearly to favor wages over tort ·except in those situations where 
specific crew members are found to be at fault. 
140 The Nettie Woodward, (D.C. Mich. 1892) 50 F. 224. 
141 The Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 1881) 7 F. 247. 
142 The C. J. Saxe, (D.C. N.Y. 1906) 145 F. 749. 
143 The Daisy Day, (D.C. Mich. 1889) 40 F. 538. In The Alexander Barkley, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1894) 83 F. 846, a default decree had been entered against the vessel on a claim of 
negligent towage. But in the distribution stage the pilot was not bound by the earlier 
determination, and succeeded in getting priority because the court found him not at fault. 
The personal fault idea was employed in The Owego, (D.C. Wash. 1923) 292 F. 505, 1923 
A.M.C. 1057, a case of cargo damage, and this was followed in the James W. Follette, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 1525, involving the claim for unseaworthiness, which is not to 
be imputed to the crew. 
144 Provost v. The Selkirk, (D.C. Ohio 1878) Fed. Cas. No. ll,455; The America, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288; The Glen Iris, (D.C. N.Y. 1896) 78 F. 511. 
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There is not much question about the priority of wages over 
general contract claims for supplies, repairs, and other neces-
saries.145 A large number of cases also hold that crew members 
who are innocent of statutory violations lose neither their lien nor 
priority where the vessel is forfeited for breach of federal laws.146 
The theory is that maritime liens are granted because they provide 
"wings and legs" to the vessel. The liens are seen as a benefit to 
the government which seeks forfeiture.147 Against the claim for 
forfeiture, common law liens are almost universally held to fail, 
however.148 
With seamen's liens there.is ·sometimes a problem encountered 
when the vessel is libelled·by another claimant. The seamen may 
continue to work about the ship's tasks, and file their own libel at 
a later date. Some courts say that no wage lien can be granted 
after the first libel, 149 but others allow it and give priority up to 
the time when the libel on behalf of the crew is filed.150 The 
proper resolution would seem to lie in the nature of the first libel. 
If the vessel is arrested, no lien should be granted for work done 
thereafter, on the authority of The Poznan.151 But if the vessel is 
still free it would seem reasonable to allow continued accrual and 
priority of the wage lien. 
B. Salvage and General Average. Aside from the conflict 
with seamen's claims which has been discussed above, there is vir-
tual unanimity today that salvage is at least. superior to all other 
classes of liens.152 In the past, there have been expressions to the 
146 Saylor v. Taylor, (4th Cir. 1896) 77 F. 476; The Samuel Little, (2d Cir. 1915) 221 
F. 308; The City of Athens, (D.C. Md. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 67, 1949 A.M.C. 572. 
146 The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 409 (1824), is the basic case on the effect 
of forfeiture on maritime liens. This was a slave trading case. • See also: The Thomaston, 
(D.C. Md. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 279, 1928 A.M.C .. 845 (liquor smuggling); The J. R. Hardee, 
(D.C. Tex. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 379, 1952 A.M.C. 1124 (tax lien); The Winona, (D.C. S.C. 
1927) 1928 A.M.C. 108 (illegal sale of the vessel); The Mary A., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 52 F. 
(2d) 982, 1931 A.M.C. 1220 (liquor laws); The Florenzo, (D.C. N:Y. 1828) Fed. Cas. No. 
~~ . 
147 The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 409 (1824); The River Queen, (D.C. 
Va. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 426, 1926 A.M.C. 79. 
148 The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 409 (1824); The Thomaston, (D.C. Md. 
1928) 26 F. (2d) 279, 1928 A.M.C. 845; The Olympia, (D.C. Conn. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 638, 
1932 A.M.C. 1161. 
149 Bromfield Co. v. The Yacht Brown, Smith & Jones, (D.C. Mass. 1954) 117 F. Supp. 
630, 1954 A.M.C. 350. 
150 The Herbert L. Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 156, 1944 A.M.C. 222; The 
Nisseqogue, (D.C. N.C. 1922) 280 F. 174. 
161274 U.S. 117, 47 S.Ct. 482, 1927 A.M.C. 723 (1927). 
152The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770; The 
Lillie Laurie, (C.C. Tex. 1880) 50 F. 219; Provost v. The Selkirk, (D.C. Ohio 1878) Fed. Cas. 
No. 11,455. 
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contrary163 but these views seem to have had no permanent effect. 
No distinction has been made between pure salvage and contract 
salvage. The courts give priority to the one as readily as the 
other.154 Usually-when salvage occurs the vessel is unable to pro-
ceed very soon in the completion of its voyage, and in many cases 
the salvage constitutes the effective end of the voyage. Thus the 
salvor will frequently be the last one to render service, and he may 
also be the first one to assert his claim. It is even possible that the 
high rank of salvage arose as a rationalization from strict time 
priority. In point of time the salvor usually has "contributed most 
immediately" to the preservation of the res. If enough cases arise 
on facts of that sort, and the court is used to thinking in terms of 
strict time, it is not too large an inductive jump to say that salvage 
is always preferred. There is always the possibility that if a salvor 
were not prompt in enforcement he might not be so highly privi-
leged as in the case where he has the property and benefit theories 
working in his favor.155 
The lien for general average is sometimes said to be in the 
nature of salvage. In an early case156 Justice Story pointed to the 
elements of sacrifice and saving of the venture. The lien arises 
under the general maritime law, independently of contract, and 
it is one for the benefit of those against whom it is claimed. In 
all these respects it is analogous. This view was expressly approved 
by the Supreme Court,157 but the priorities question was left un-
decided. It has been viewed as occupying the same rank as 
salvage158 and as falling just below it.159 In one case it was ranked 
over bottomry on the theory that it preserved the security for the 
bondholders.160 But that did not adjudicate its position regarding 
any other liens. 
Some courts might classify the lien as falling more into the 
category of contracts of affreightment. In The Andree161 the court 
said: 
153 The America, (D.C. N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288. 
154The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770; The 
Athenian, (D.C. Mich. 1877) 3 F. 248, relying upon English cases. 
155 See The Oddyseus III, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 297, 1948 A.M.C. 608, where 
general average, called therein a form of salvage, was deferred because of time lapse. 
156 United States v. Wilder, (C.C. Mass. 1838) Fed. Cas. No. 16,694. 
157 Dupont deNemours & Co. v. Vance, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 162 (1856). 
158 The Oddyseus ill, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 297, 1948 A.M.C. 608. 
159 Provost v. The Selkirk, (D.C. Ohio 1878) Fed. Cas. No. 11,455, but this is only 
dictum. 
160 The Dora, (D.C. La. 1887) 34 F. 343. 
101 (D.C. N.Y. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 812. 
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"A maritime adventure is a multipartite relationship 
which is comparable, in a sense, to a partnership between the 
interests involved. The law of general average, when the con-
tingency arises on which it can properly be invoked, is the 
partnership law of the adventure, and concerns itself, not with 
the claims for damage to the adventure by outsiders, but 
wholly with the equitable adjustment, under its rules, of the 
rights and liabilities inter sese of the partners to the adven-
ture."1a2 
As a manifestation of the partnership law of the venture the lien 
could be given a somewhat lower rank than that suggested by 
Story's approach. Because of the paucity of cases on this point the 
priorities question is likely to remain in doubt for some time yet. 
On the whole the argument for a salvage position is quite com-
pelling in view of the traditional policies which are imbedded in 
the law of maritime liens. While there is not the need to en-
courage the sacrifice, as there is in the case of salvage, there is an 
involuntary character to the loss, and it is beneficial to the vessel, 
unlike tort. 
C. Torts and Quasi-Torts. The situation of tort liens is un-
settled both as to the type of claim that falls into the class and as 
to what priority should be given in respect to other classes. We 
have already seen that the personal injuries of seamen may or may 
not be classified as tort for some purposes. We have also seen 
that some courts have granted priority to tort over previously 
earned wages. One of the most important remaining issues is the 
comparative rank of tort with liens arising out of contracts for 
necessaries such as repairs and supplies. 
I. Collision. The common tort lien encountered in priorities 
cases is that for collision. In many ways it is the typical maritime 
tort, and it is this lien which is ordinarily referred to when the 
courts speak of the class rank of "tort." In the past some courts 
have expounded a generalized doctrine that liens arising ex delicto 
are superior to those arising ex contractu.163 Perhaps by "ex con-
tractu" the courts really mean contracts for necessaries. At any 
rate it is apparent that this is an unworkably broad statement, for 
wages and some salvage liens may be founded on contract, but they 
162 Id. at 816. 
163 The Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 3 F. 162; The M. Vandercook, (D.C. N.J. 
1885) 24 F. 472; The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770 
(dictum). 
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have a clear preference over tort.164 Even on the proposition that 
collision liens should rank repairs and supplies there is hearty dis-
agreement. For some time there was an opposite school of thought 
which believed all contract liens to be superior to tort.165 The 
reasoning was that supplies, repairs, bottomry, and contracts of 
affreightment were an aid to maritime commerce in general and a 
furtherance of the venture in particular. It was felt that damage 
liens were really in the nature of "perils of the sea" -though that 
seems a misuse of the term-and these perils are usually secured 
by a policy of marine insurance. If not so secured they should be. 
To subordinate contract liens would be to make the contract 
lienors reinsurers pro tanto of the underwriters of the ship.166 To 
put supplymen at the mercy of later torts would, it was thought, 
discourage credit, which constitutes the "wings and legs" of the 
vessel.1 67 This was inextricably involved with the theory that 
benefit to the vessel was the sole test of lien priority, and that the 
property theory was without foundation.168 
As a doctrine and as a basis for decision these views were large-
ly vitiated by the concrete result reached by the Supreme Court 
in The John G. Stevens,169 which held that a lien for tort, whether 
arising from collision or negligent towage, is to be preferred to 
supply claims arising before the tort. The Court definitely re-
instated the property theory of priority, though it left the benefit 
theory undisturbed. The opinion assiduously avoided reference 
to time periods as such, and the Court expressly limited its decision 
to the precise facts of the case. It can be interpreted as an applica-
tion of strict time priority between these two competing classes of 
liens. The case definitely did not hold that torts rank contracts in 
general.170 The binding and authoritative rule of the Stevens171 
is that whenever a tort occurs it swallows up all pre-existing liens 
164 Other courts have been strongly critical of such overstatement. In The Penobscot, 
(D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1217, the belief is expressed that the dictum in The Wil-
liam Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770, is based upon a mis-
conception of the John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
165 The Young America, (D.C. N.Y. 1887) 30 F. 789; The Amos D. Carver, (D.C. N.Y. 
1888) 35 F. 665; The Proceeds of The Gratitude, (D.C. N.Y. 1890) 42 F. 299. All three of 
these opinions are by Judge Addison Brown. 
160 The Amos D. Carver, (D.C. N.Y. 1888) 35 F. 665. 
167 The Young America, (D.C. N.Y. 1887) 30 F. 789. 
168The rationale of The Frank G. Fowler, (C.C. N.Y. 1883) 17 F. 653, and The J. W. 
Tucker, (D.C. N.Y. 1884) 20 F. 129. 
169 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
170 The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. ( 2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770, and other 
cases have taken that to be the policy implicit in the John G. Stevens, however. 
111170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
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based upon repairs, supplies, and other necessaries.172 There is a 
tendency to interpret it as requiring a strict time inverse priority 
among successive torts,173 but in view of the established period 
rules that would seem to be a too literal application of the property 
theory. The opinion in the Stevens174 is careful to avoid the prob-
lem of torts among themselves, and if "time within each class" is 
the predominant mode of priority the tort liens ought to be ad-
justed inter se by some period rule. 
The question of all torts against all contracts also was left un-
touched by the Supreme Court. As a result, those courts which 
approve of the benefit theory exclusively, and who feel that the 
contract lienor should not take the risk of collision, have been 
able to say that contract liens arising subsequent to collision are 
to be preferred.175 What this amounts to is only a grudging ac-
ceptance of the Stevens.176 It means that those tribunals regard 
the Supreme Court's determination as a mere intrusion upon the 
benefit theory, which is conceived to be the basic rule. It means 
that they are unable to accept the clear language in which the 
property theory was revitalized, if indeed there was ever a ques-
tion of its liveliness as an instrument of admiralty jurisprudence. 
To continue along such a course also does violence to the system 
of time priorities; If the time periods are to be meaningful as a 
technique for securing just results they ought to be applied in a 
uniform manner. Once it is admitted that the periods will be 
applied, the problem of tort versus contract is foreclosed. The 
Stevens171 says, without regard to time periods, that if a tort occurs 
it shall be preferred to previous contracts. Thus, if the torts oc-
curring within any voyage or other time period are to be co-equal, 
it follows that they must be given priority together irrespective of 
whether any contract claims have arisen between the various torts. 
It would be inharmonious to say that the resolution of the tort 
against contract problem should depend upon the mere chance 
that there are several torts or only one. 
112 And so applied in The Baker Brothers, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 920, 1928 
A.M.C; 1600, and The Fanny F. Hickey, (D.C. Mass. 1931) 1931 A.M.C. 794. 
173 The America, (D.C. N.J. 1909) 168 F. 424. 
174 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
175 The Baker Brothers, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 920, 1928 A.M.C. 1600; The 
Penobscot, (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1217; The Glen Island, (D.C. N.Y. 1912) 194 F. 
744 (at least if the tort claimant had an opportunity to enforce); The America, (D.C. N.J. 
1909) 168 F. 242. 
176 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
177 Ibid. 
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Not only does the theory of time priorities militate in favor of 
giving a preference to tort, but there are substantial policy reasons 
as well. The supplier, repairman, or bottomry holder has an option 
to take the risk or not, just as he chooses. But the claimant in 
damage has no option at all.178 There is the further argument 
that reparation for harm done by breach of the rules of the road is 
at least as great an aid to commerce as helping the ship chandler. 
The fact that insurance could be procured should not change the 
law of maritime torts any more than it does the law of automobile 
negligence. 
2. Negligent towage. The other main point which was nec-
essary to the decision of the Stevens119 was that the claim arising 
out of negligent towage sounds in tort. It had been held previously 
by some courts, in adherence to the benefit theory, that damages 
suffered by a tow due to the tug' s negligence were not a tort180 or 
else were sui generis, being neither a contract claim for necessaries 
nor a true tort.181 It had been pointed out by others that "this is 
true, undoubtedly, but it is also essential to commerce that the ship 
when equipped should find employment. Giving it legs and wings 
to speed it on its way is profitless, if it goes empty."182 Despite the 
ruling in the Stevens183 the negligent towage claim has been han-
dled variously, in some cases ranking equally with contracts,184 in 
others being placed even below that.185 
3. Contracts of affreightment. A recurrent problem, and one 
which is made doubly important in- the light of the Ship Mortgage 
Act of 1920,186 is the classification of claims arising out of contracts 
of affreightment. In the Stevens181 it was contended that the negli-
gent towage claim was one for a mere breach of contract. In hold-
ing that the action sounded in tort the court analogized it to cases 
involving common carriers who neglect to carry and deliver persons 
or property in safety. In the common carrier cases, said the court, 
178 This was pointed out by Judge Benedict in The Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 
1880) 3 F. 162, but it was not accepted in certain later decisions in the New York district. 
179 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
1so The Samuel J. Christian, (D.C. N.Y. 1883) 16 F. 796. 
181 The Young America, (D.C. N.Y. 1887) 30 F. 789. 
182 The Daisy Day, (D.C. Mich. 1889) 40 F. 538 at 541. See also the M. Vandercook, 
(D.C. N.J. 1885) 24 F. 472, which likewise holds negligent towage to be a tort. 
183170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
184 The Interstate No. 1, (2d Cir. 1923) 290 F. 926, 1923 A.M.C. 1118. 
185 The John J. Frietus, (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 252 F. 876. 
186 41 Stat. L. 1000, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §911. 
187 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
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the action was for breach of a duty imposed by law, independently 
of any contract or consideration. If the contract of towage were 
gratuitous the duty of due care would still be imposed. This broad 
principle of tort liability arising from the duties of a carrier has 
been argued in a number of cases in an attempt either to get a 
preference over contract claims or to avoid being subjected to a 
preferred ship mortgage. The courts tend to analyze the particu-
lar transaction or event involved, however, in order to determine 
its proper category. The cases are few, but they are interesting 
because they indicate the multifarious distinctions which can be 
drawn. 
In The St. Paul188 the vessel was seized by the marshal after it 
was fully loaded and about to sail. Subsequently a fire broke out, 
damaging part of the goods. The shippers were forced to unload 
the remaining cargo and thus incur further expenses. It later 
turned out that the vessel had been unseaworthy all along, for it 
was never licensed for the kind of voyage it had undertaken to 
perform. As against the contentions of the shippers, the court held 
their claims to be in contract and not in tort, on the ground that 
the actions were for breach of an implied warranty of seaworthi-
ness, a contractual type of liability. But even as contract claimants 
these lienors were placed junior to repair and supplymen. The 
court said that the shippers did not benefit the vessel, and bene-
ficial contracts should be put in a higher class than ordinary con-
tracts. From the standpoint of policy the court remarked that sup-
plies would be hard to obtain-if shippers were allowed to eat up 
the proceeds in this manner. The shipper's liens for unearned 
freight were put on the same plane as those of the supplymen, how-
ever, because the prepayment helped put the vessel in funds for the 
voyage. · 
In The Henry W. Breyer189 the failure to perform the contract 
of private carriage was held to be in the nature of a tort, analogiz-
ing from the common carrier ~ases. The tort consisted of accepting 
goods or freight money with knowledge of possible inability to 
perform. This was not a problem of getting priority over a supply-
man but over a preferred ship mortgagee. Perhaps the court was 
worried about discouraging shippers, just as the court in The St. 
Paul190 was worried about supplymen. 
188 (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 277 F. 99. 
189 (D.C. Md. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 423, 1927 A.M.C. 290. 
100 (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 277 F. 99. 
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Quite close on its facts is The Penobscot.191 The vessel failed 
to transport the cargo on a contract of private carriage, and there 
was a preferred ship mortgage in the picture. The freight had been 
prepaid. The court said that if this were a failure to transport by 
a common carrier it might be a tort under the dictum of the 
Stevens.192 But this was a private carrier and the only source of 
liability was the contract. The Breyer case193 was distinguished 
on the ground that there the basis of tort was the deceit by the 
carrier in taking the goods with knowledge of his inability to per-
form. Here there was a mere failure to carry. On the issue of the 
prepaid freight the court interpreted Krauss & Co. v. Dimon S.S. 
Co.194 as saying impliedly that overpayment of freight is a contract 
lien, although it was admitted that the point was not completely 
clear. Having arrayed these claims in the contract category, the 
court held them to be junior to repairs and supplies, following the 
non-beneficial theory of The St. Paul.195 
The difficulty encountered with these affreightment ~ontracts 
is likely to remain for some time yet. We have just seen that this 
lien is susceptible to many distinctions and points of view. If any-
thing it illustrates the importance of fundamental theories in the 
field of lien priorities. It shows that a basic approach such as the 
benefit theory has remarkable viability despite its being disfavored 
by the Supreme Court. Such a basic approach has the flexibility 
to be applied to a number of novel situations as they arise. Begin-
ning as a reason for granting a supplyman's lien, it has evolved into 
a negative doctrine requiring the subordination of other liens. As 
a practical matter one cannot but wonder whether there can be 
such a thing as a non-beneficial contract lien. If a contract is not a 
benefit to the vessel there ought really to be no lien at all. 
D. Contracts for Necessaries. Most of the problems COJ?-cern-
ing the comparative class rank of the lien for repairs, supplies, and 
other necessaries have been discussed above. We have seen that 
some courts divide contracts into two groups, depending on 
whether they are "beneficial" or not, giving the "non-beneficial" 
ones a lower rank. But most courts put the various contract liens 
upon a parity, when they do not have a higher rank. We saw also 
191 (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1217. 
192170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). 
193 (D.C. Md. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 423, 1927 A.M.C. 290. 
194290 U.S. 117, 54 S.Ct. 105 (1933). 
195 (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 277 F. 99. 
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that when the liens of watchmen, stevedores, and pilots do no_t fall 
into the class of wages they are usually assigned to the necessaries 
category. The problem remaining is largely one of classification. 
There is general assent that repairs and supplies are contract 
liens for necessaries. Towage (the lien for service by a tug) is 
clearly of the same class.196 Most of the dispute over wharfage con-
cerns its existence as a lien197 rather than its class rank. Where it 
is granted it occupies the same position as other necessaries.198 Like 
the watchman's lien it may obtain a top ranking if it occurs by 
authorization of the court while the vessel is in custodia legis.199 
The position of bottomry has never been determined ade-
quately, but it is largely unimportant in view of its rapid obso-
lescence as a maritime security device. It was mainly used in Eng-
land to afford a lien to supplymen, who at one time had no lien as 
such.200 What American cases there are indicate only that it will 
be subjugated to later liens for collision201 or for supplies.202 One 
judge thought it should be in a class with necessaries if the bond 
was executed by the master, but in a lower class if executed by the 
owner.2os 
There is good authority for allowing a lien for such items as 
consul fees, customhouse dues, hospitalization of crew, and survey 
of the vessel's condition, giving them the same rank as necessa-
ries.204 The lien for insurance premiums, where it is given at 
all,205 seems to occupy a place below necessaries.206 
196 Porter v. The Sea Witch, (C.C. La. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 11,289; The Athenian, 
(D.C. Mich. 1877) 3 F. 248. 
197 Dealing with the difliculty of acquiring a lien for wharfage: The Advance, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1894) 60 F. 766; The Shrewsbury, (D.C. Ohio 1895) 69 F. 1017; The Murphy Tugs, 
(D.C. Mich. 1886) 28 F. 429; The C. Vanderbilt, (D.C. N.Y. 1898) 86 F. 785; The General 
Lincoln, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 441. 
198 The Estrada Palma, (D.C. La. 1923) 8 F. (2d) 103, 1923 A.M.C. 1040; The William 
Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 1770; The Advance, (D.C. N.Y. 
1894) 60 F. 766; The Shrewsbury, (D.C. Ohio 1895) 69 F. 1017; The Murphy Tugs, (D.C. 
Mich. 1886) 28 F. 429; The C. Vanderbilt, (D.C. N.Y. 1898) 86 F. 785; The General 
Lincoln, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 441. 
199 The Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 47 S.Ct. 482, 1927 A.M.C. 723 (1927); The Herbert L. 
Rawding, (D.C. S.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 156, 1944 A.M.C. 222; The J. R. Hardee, (D.C. 
Tex. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 379, 1952 A.M.C. 1124. 
1200 PRICE, THE LAw oF MARITIME LIENS, c. 3 (1940). 
201 The Pride of the Ocean, (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 3 F. 162. 
202 The Aina, (D.C. N.Y. 1889) 40 F. 269; The Dora, (D.C. La. 1888) 34 F. 348, giving 
advances for wages over bottomry, and The Dora, (D.C. La. 1887) 34 F. 34~, giving general 
average over bottomry. · 
20s The America, (D.C. N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288. 
204 The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 666 (1873); The Aina, (D.C. N.Y. 1889) 40 
F. 269. 
205 Not given in The City of Camden, (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 F. 847. 
206 The Daisy Day, (D.C. Mich. 1889) 40 F. 538, puts it below supplies. The Dolphin, 
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E. The Preferred Ship Mortgage. As a creature of statute,207 
the preferred ship mortgage is granted a lien and a certain priority 
by the same express legislation. The attempt will be made here to 
deal only with the priorities aspect of the act.208 The relevant statu-
tory provisions are: 
" ... the term 'preferred maritime lien' means (1) a lien aris-
ing prior in time to the recording and indorsement of a pre-
ferred mortgage in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter; or (2) a lien for damages arising out of tort, for 
wages of a stevedore when employed directly by the owner, 
operator, master, ship's husband, or agent of the vessel, for 
wages of the crew of the vessel, for general average, and for 
salvage, including contract salvage. 
". . . the preferred mortgage lien shall have priority over all 
claims against the vessel, except (1) preferred maritime liens, 
and (2) expenses and fees allowed and costs taxed, by the 
court."200 
What the act does in effect is to put the mortgage junior to con-
tracts for necessaries which are earlier in point of strict time to the 
filing date of the mortgage, but senior to the contracts for neces-
saries which come after. It leaves many classes of liens undisturbed 
and unimpaired. 
The problem which arises is that the mortgage itself operates 
as it would at common law, but the statute does not expressly 
change the priorities of maritime liens among themselves. Thus if 
there are supply liens before and after the mortgage, the one com-
ing after the mortgage is junior to it under the statute, yet by the 
maritime law it is senior to the supply lien coming before the mort-
gage, and that in tum is superior to the mortgage. This situation 
is interpreted by some as a problem in "circular priorities," the 
solutions to which are several.210 The same problem would be 
present if the earlier claim were barred by laches in relation to the 
(D.C. Mich. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 3,973, grants it and says in dictum that it would be below 
supplies. But see The Guiding Star, (C.C. Ohio 1883) 18 F. 263, which grants it but seems 
to give it a supplyman's priority. 
207 Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, 41 Stat. L. 1000, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §911. 
208 On the act generally, see RonrnsoN, ADMIRALTY §§63-66 (1939). 
209 41 Stat. L. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §953. By a 1954 amendment to §951, 
mortgages and hypothecations of foreign vessels are recognized as conferring a maritime 
lien under certain conditions, but such a lien is made expressly subordinate to "maritime 
liens for repairs, supplies, towage, use of drydock or marine railway, or other necessaries, 
performed or supplied in the United States." 68 Stat. L. 323, 46 U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1955) 
§951. 
210 Kellogg, "Priorities Puzzle under Ship Mortgage Act," 2 WASH. L. REv. 117 (1927), 
proposes that each should get something from the fund. A recent note, "Priorities of 
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later supplyman, but were not a stale claim as to the mortgagee. 
And in those courts which adhere rigidly to the benefit theory the 
later supply lien might be superior to an earlier tort claim, but for 
the statute. 
So far the response of the courts to this problem has been fairly 
uniform. In The Zizania211 there were towage liens accruing be-
fore the mortgage and a number of contract liens after. These later 
lienors contended that under the calendar year rule they should 
be placed over the earlier towage claims, and that the statute did 
not change the priorities of supply liens inter se. The court inter-
preted the mortgage act as requiring the opposite result: it carried 
the common law system of priorities all the way through. Although 
Congress may not have considered this effect, the court felt that the 
language of the statute obliterates the maritime law priorities 
within the contract class whenever there is a preferred ship mort-
gage in the case. The same result was reached in another case pre-
senting a similar factual pattern, in which the court said that sup-
plymen are put on notice by the statute that they may be subordi-
nated in this manner, and for that reason there is no injustice in 
this result.212 
In another case of this kind the later lienors contended that 
they ought at least to share pro rata in the amount allocated to the 
earlier supply claims, as this would certainly not affect the amount 
received by the preferred mortgagee.213 Once again this argument 
was rejected on the grounds that it violated the statutory intent. 
There is no indication that the above cases will be accepted un-
critically. One court has expressed its dissatisfaction with The 
Maritime Liens," 69 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1956), takes up the problem in the light of Na-
tional Shawmut Bank v. The Winthrop, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 370. The note• 
writer feels that the more equitable result would be to allow the postmortgage supply 
lienor to satisfy himself to the extent that the total fund exceeds the mortgagee's claim, 
such amount to be satisfied out of the proceeds allotted to the antemortgage supply lienor. 
This view would seem to ignore the pulJ>OSe of the period rules, by which the postmort-
gage supply lienor is clearly in a superior position. The priority problem exists only 
between the two supply Iienors, for under the statute the proceeds payable to the mort-
gagee are fixed with exactitude. The amount recoverable by the postmortgage supplyman, 
when by the maritime law he has priority, should simply depend upon how much of the 
fund is,· by the statute, allotted to the antemortgage supply lienor. 
211 (D.C. Mass. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 770. 
212 The John Cadwalader, (D.C. Pa. 1937) 1937 A.M.C. 395. See also National Shaw-
mut Bank v. The Winthrop, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 370, in which the court 
refused to apply the calendar year rule in favor of postmortgage Iienors. 
21s University Nat. Bank v. The Home, (D.C. Wash. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 94, 1946 A.M.C. 
585. 
1956] MARITIME LIEN PRIORITIES 815 
Zizania/14 calling it a "surprising result."215 It certainly seems 
legitimate to argue that the statute fixed only the relationship 
between the mortgage and contracts for necessaries, not the rela-
tionship of contract liens among themselves. The workable alterna-
tive to the above cases would be to allow the later supplymen to 
satisfy themselves so far as they can out of the proceeds allotted to 
the supply liens arising before the mortgage. 
F. Miscellaneous Rankings. There is authority for giving a 
high rank to "costs," placing them above seamen's wages. Just what 
this means is not completely clear. In some cases the costs are said 
simply to be first in rank,216 while in others it is the costs of the first 
libellant which are preferred.217 The most coherent group of cases 
are those saying that the costs· should be allowed with the claims.218 
Even here a differentiation can be made in either allowing the cost 
ahead of the lien to which it attaches219 or merely "with" each 
claim. The expenses incurred preserving the vessel while it is 
under arrest will be allowed a first preference as costs, even though 
no lien can arise in those circumstances.220 
It is settled that one who advances money to be used to pay off 
maritime liens acquires a lien for such advances.221 The lien is 
subrogated to the claims paid and is entitled to the same priority 
on a proportionate basis.222 
A non-maritime claim, that is, any claim which does not import 
_a maritime lien, occupies rhe lowest order of rank.223 
214 (D.C. Mass. 1934) 1934 A.M.C. 770. 
215 The Penobscot, (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1940 A.M.C. 1217 decided in the same district. 
216 The Esteban de Antunano, (C.C. La. 1887) 31 F. 920. 
217 Goble v. The Delos De Wolf, (D.C. Ohio 1880) 3 F. 236. 
218The Daisy Day, (D.C. Mich. 1889) 40 F. 538; The Nisseqogue, (D.C. N.C. 1922) 280 
F. 174. 
219 The John Gully, (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 211, 1927 A.M.C. 1175. 
220 The Poman, 274 U.S. 117, 47 S.Ct. 482, 1927 A.M.C. 723 (1927). 
221 The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 666 (1873). 
222 The Bethulia, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 200 F. 876; The Thomas Sherlock, (D.C. Ohio 
1884) 22 F. 253; The Aina, (D.C. N.Y. 1889) 40 F. 269; The Dora, (D.C. La. 1888) 34 F. 348; 
The Nisseqogue, (D.C. N.C. 1922) 28(l F. 174; The Commack, (D.C. Fla. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 
151; The City of Camden, (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 F'.· 847; The Minnie &: Emma, (D.C. Md. 
1927) 21 F. (2d) 991. 
223 The Family Souder, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 666 (1873); The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. I, 
13 S.Ct. 498 (1893); The Athenian, (D.C. Mich. 1877) 3 F. 248; The Guiding Star, (C.C. 
Ohio 1883) 18 F. 263; The Little Charley, (D.C. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 120, 1929 A.M.C. 398. 
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III. CLASS VERSUS TIME 
A much overlooked problem is the relationship between pri-
orities measured by time formulae and priorities determined by 
class rank. Obviously one scheme must give way to the other. 
They are co-existent but not co-equal. Surprisingly few cases have 
dealt with the question specifically. Either the system has been 
assumed to operate in a definite fashion, or the question was un-
necessary to the decision of the case. The alternatives are clear. If 
class rank is to be predominant, the liens should be arrayed into 
classes, and time priority would then operate within each class, the 
later liens taking precedence over the earlier ones. As between the 
various classes time would not be a factor. An earlier wage claim 
would still have priority over a later supplyman's claim. On the 
other hand, if time is to be the governing consideration, the liens 
should be arrayed primarily into time periods, and class rank would 
then operate only within each period. The later supplyman's claim 
would cut off the earlier wage claim. The resolution of this prob-
lem would seem to rest upon the strength of the policies which lie 
behind the time and class concepts of priority. It is safe to say that 
most courts are committed to class over time, but a few have taken 
an opposite position, and the practical effect in certain other cases 
has been to favor time priority while paying lip service to the 
majority view. The formula "time, within each class" is repeated 
almost automatically. In many cases there is no express recognition 
of the problem, but the distribution is according to class rank first, 
the assumption being that the priorities operate in this manner. 
An additional argument for class rank over time can be derived by 
implication from the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920,224 which labels 
certain liens as preferred .over the ship mortgage, while leaving 
others on a lower plane. It can only be taken as an indication that 
the draftsmen believed that a class structure was the settled primary 
method of aligning the liens in distribution. 
As a practical guide the courts have relied heavily upon The 
City of Tawas225 which is unequivocal in its language. It influ-
enced the course of decision in the Second Circuit226 as well as in 
224 46 Stat. L. 1000, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §911. 
225 (D.C. Mich. 1880) 3 F. 170 at 173. 
226The Towanda, (D.C. N.Y. 1914) 215 F. 232; The Samuel Little, (2d Cir. 1915) 221 
F. 308 at 317, which qualified the language in The Proceeds of The Gratitude, (D.C. N.Y. 
1890) 42 F. 299. 
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other districts.227 It is not too much to say that this is the generally 
accepted rule, applied in the ordinary case without hesitation. In 
many cases the issue is not present, of course, because all or most of 
the liens are within the same time period. 
The principle of class over time has not been an avowed or 
clear one throughout the history of American admiralty, however. 
In The Paragon228 Judge Ware spoke approvingly of the civil law 
rule that wage claims retain their priority only for the most recent 
voyage.229 In The Proceeds of The Gratitude/30 the case most fre-
quently cited in support of the voyage and 40-day rules, the court 
said: "The general maritime law adjusts all liens by the voyage .... 
By the general rule ... the priority of liens continues only till the 
next voyage. The liens connected with every new voyage start with 
a priority over all former ones after the ship sails, if there has pre-
viously been opportunity to enforce them."231 Taken literally that 
language would certainly require a time over class result. It was 
not subsequently interpreted that way, however. 
The confusing thing is that courts persistently quote the lan-
guage of The Proceeds of the Gratitude/32 but apply it within each 
class, seemingly unconscious of the ambiguity involved. One re-
cent case holds concretely that time is over class, doing so without 
hesitation.233 Other than this there is a paucity of authority for 
holding time superior to class. Why this should be so is not clear 
from a philosophical standpoint. Time is really the more general 
category. Effectually speaking, it is a rule of reason concerning 
fairness in the enforcement of liens. Seemingly it ought to cut across 
all types of claims, as does the rule of laches, or as do the ordinary 
statutes of limitations. To the contrary, the courts evidently feel 
that the "inherent merit" which is the basis of class rank is of far 
greater importance than the individual conduct of the lienor him-
self in making an effort to enforce. It is possible that the preference 
227 For example, The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862, 1927 A.M.C. 
1770; The General Lincoln, (D.C. Md. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 441. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §61 
(1939) assumes the rule to be as stated in The William Leishear and The City of Tawas, 
(D.C. Mich. 1880) 3 F. 170, and repeats the class over time formula. 
22s (D.C. Mass. 1836) Fed. Cas. No. 10,708. 
220 Although this was only dictum it is certainly evidence that at an early date there 
was doubt on the matter. See also the equivocal language in The Fanny, (D.C. Mass. 
1876) Fed. Cas. No. 4,638, and The Melita, (D.C. Md. 1880) Fed. Cas. No. 6,218. 
230 (D.C. N.Y. 1890) 42 F. 299 . 
.231 Id. at 300. 
232 The Samuel Little, (2d Cir. 1915) 221 F. 308, "clarified" it, resolving a dispute over 
its meaning. 
233 The Oddyseus III, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 297, 1948 A.M.C. 608. 
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for class arose in c~ses involving wage claims from an earlier voy-
age.234 Courts have been and still are reluctant to see the seamen 
unsatisfied. Perhaps it was only a short analogical step from grant-
ing priority to all seamen's wage liens to granting priority to all 
claims in each class over the other. 
We have already seen that some courts in effect use a mixed 
system of time and class when they declare a "waiver of priority" to 
have taken place by a mere delay in enforcement. It illustrates a 
dissatisfaction with an automatic rule of class over time. Of the 
same order are those cases, discussed above, which hold that class 
priority will give way when there is a certain sequence of events, 
such as wages earned followed by a tort or a salvage service. Some 
courts are prone to say that the tort or salvage has precedence over 
the wages earned previously. This means really th_at certain no-
tions of strict time priority are allowed to operate despite a general 
adherence to a class system of ranking. It is submitted that a mixed 
system of class and time is highly unpredictable, if not anomalous, 
even though beneficient results may flow in the particular case. 
Predictability is difficult in two dimensions, but almost impossible 
in three. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Those who have written on the subject of priorities recognize 
the need for a determinate system. Some writers have advocated a 
full-blown property theory, by which all liens would take prece-
dence on a basis of strict time.235 Priority would operate inversely 
according to the dates when the liens accrue. Even here these 
writers would make exceptions in the case of seamen's wages on 
the ground that they are not really "secret" liens, for everyone 
knows that seamen are unpaid until the end of the voyage. And 
certain of the time period rules would be recognized because they 
are said to be merely an "arbitrary" method for determining the 
date of accrual.236 Although these views have the merit of simplic-
ity, they also seem to overlook certain vital considerations. For one 
. 234 Judge Hall in The America, (D.C. N.Y. 1853) Fed. Cas. No. 288, thought seamen 
should be preferred for only one voyage, but that all other liens went by strict time. 
~35 Beach, "Relative Priority of Maritime Liens," 33 YALE L.J. 841 (1924), and Hebert, 
"The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens," 4 TULANE L. REV. 381 (1930). Both of these 
writers argue that The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore, P.C. 267 (1850-51), the first case to see 
all liens as a proprietary interest, was implicitly recognized and adopted as the funda-
mental doctrine in The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 18 S.Ct. 544 (1898). But such an 
argument would seem to overlook other important American cases. 
236 Ibid.: Beach would allow the season and harbor rules, while Hebert apparently 
would recognize the various period rules. 
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thing, the property concept has no objective validity other than its 
usefulness as an intellectual shorthand expression for explaining 
results. It is not an inexorable legal command, and that is demon-
strated by the vast number of decisions which are based upon other 
notions. Likewise these writers seem to misconceive the true nature 
of the time period rules. Those rules do not exist merely to sim-
plify the court's task in determining what liens are virtually con-
temporaneous, and thus to be taken as arising together because the 
time difference between them is only de minimis. Rather, they are 
rules of reason, resting upon basic notions of fairness. The only 
thing arbitrary about them is that a certain time length is taken as 
the criterion. 
Another writer has suggested more flexibility in the application 
of time period rules, and indicates dissatisfaction with theories of 
ownership.237 The courts themselves exhibit a tendency to follow 
earlier cases on points in controversy, often doing so with little dis-
cussion of the principles and policies invoked. That must stem 
largely from convenience, because it is not very often that a priori-
ties case will involve many binding precedents. We have seen that 
the courts continue to give effect to several principles of priority 
and not to a single one. If a theory of priorities is to have practical 
utility it ought to be as descriptive and explanatory as possible. It 
ought to account for more than one line of cases, and should do 
more than propound a single point of view. The following pro-
posals are submitted only as one possible approach. 
The class ranks are so well established that they can be said to 
be definite rules of law. In the matter of comparative ranking, we 
have seen that many unresolved issues still exist today. In resolving 
those issues a court probably is justified in adopting the priority 
which it deems best, for in the main it must decide that issue on 
policy grounds. It is arguable what the best policy is, but choice 
lies with the court. Once a comparative ranking is adopted, how-
ever, it should not be subject to broad exceptions or strict time 
notions because that defeats the whole purpose of having classes of 
liens. One exception might be made in the matter of seamen's 
wages when there is personal fault in the picture. In the matter of 
time priority it should be recognized that the basic policy is that 
of affording lienors a reasonable opportunity to enforce. There is 
no reason why strict time should have to operate at all. To justify 
cutting off lienors before they have had a chance to enforce requires 
237Willard, "Priorities Among Maritime Liens," 16 CORN. L.Q. 522 (1931). 
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a resort to almost mystical doctrines of "ownership." The periods 
should _also be used as a measure of diligence. This would mean 
that class rank would give way to time, but it seems no more than 
a fair application of the rules, entirely consistent with the purposes 
for which they are erected. Under existing practice it is unlikely 
that many courts would use time as the predominant method of 
grouping the liens. Such a radical departure would, however, be 
a rationally defensible position to take. 
